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"Terrorism is a global menace which clearly calls for global
action. Individual actions by Member States, whether aimed
at State or non-state actors, cannot in themselves provide a
solution. We must meet this threat together."'
-Kofi Annan
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
"Major Strasser has been shot. Round up the usual suspects."
-- Captain Louis Renault, Prefect of Police, Casablanca
(1942).
Professor Viet Dinh, this year's Dunwody lecturer, was a major drafter
of and architectural influence upon the USA PATRIOT Act.2 The USA
PATRIOT Act was rushed through Congress in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001 and a national security crisis.3 The Act itself is as
1. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 53d
Sess., 7th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 10, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.7 (1998). UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan continues to advance the notion that international law must be constructed to be
receptive to contemporary issues in the course of international relations without compromising the
fundamental normative and textual constraints of the United Nations Charter. See Report of the
Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg.,
Agenda Item 10, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999).
2. Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867 (2004). See Uniting
and Stengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter USA
PATRIOT Act]; see also Robert O'Harrow Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002,
at W6. According to Professor Dinh, the Department of Justice began to assemble a package of
authorities to facilitate what Attorney General John Ashcroft demanded: all that is necessary for
law enforcement, within the bounds of the Constitution, to discharge the obligation to fight this war
against terror. Id. As Assistant Attorney General, Professor Dinh was designated by Attorney
General Ashcroft to construct such a set of policies. See Eric Lichtblau, At Home in War on Terror,
L.A. TIviES, Sept. 18, 2002, at Al. The culmination of this effort by Dinh and his colleagues was
the USA PATRIOT Act. See id.
3. Just weeks after the September I I attacks, the Department of Justice dispatched to
Congress comprehensive legislation designed to grant law enforcement agencies supplementary
power, including the enhanced ability to conduct searches, police Internet communications, employ
telephone taps, monitor financial transactions, and much more. Specifically, on October 23, 2001,
House Bill 3162, the USA PATRIOT Act, was introduced in the House of Representatives. See
H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). A timetable was established so that both the committee process and
the floor debate were bypassed; the asserted reason for this streamlined process was that it was
necessary to thwart terrorist attacks thought to be impending. Administration's DraftAnti-terrorism
Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001). The House
of Representatives voted 357 to 66 and the Senate voted 98 to I to approve the USA PATRIOT Act
on October 24 and 25, 2001, respectively. Id. The President signed it into law on October 26th.
USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. at 402; see also Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 435, 435 (2002).
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voluminous as it is complex.4 It has been widely conceded that the Act was
not critically read by key members of the legislative branch prior to its
passage into law.5 This was because these members enacted the legislation
under conditions of crisis in reliance on the good faith and integrity of the
executive branch. The Act reflects not so much the restraints of the
balance of power, but deference to the competence and integrity of the
executive branch in exceptional circumstances. The Act, it is conceded,
contains far-reaching restrictions on the liberties of American citizens6 as
well as the human rights of aliens.7 A central concern from the point of
view of national security under the Act is the ability to detain and
interrogate for as long as possible those whom the administration believes
may be terrorists, terrorist sympathizers, or dupes with inadvertent terrorist
links.' The tools to achieve these objectives, among others,9 are reflected
4. The USA PATRIOT Act is 131 pages long. USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. at 272-402.
5. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Terrorism Bill's Sparse Paper Trail May Cause Legal
Vulnerabilities, 59 CONGR. Q. WKLY. 2533, 2534 (2001) (reporting that many of the lawmakers
who voted for the USA PATRIOT Act never had a chance to read the final version before the bill
was passed); cf 147 CONG. REC. S 10,991 (daily ed. Oct. 25,2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("We
expedited the legislative process in the Judiciary Committee to consider the [Bush]
Administration's proposals. In daily news conferences prior to the original passage of the USA
[PATRIOT] Act, Attorney General [John Ashcroft] referred to the need for such prompt
consideration.").
6. E.g., USA PATRIOT Act §§ 101, 102, 107 (making it easier for the government to
initiate surveillance and wiretapping of United States citizens); § 106 (sheltering federal agents
engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution in certain
circumstances); § 126 (giving the government secret access to credit reports without consent or
judicial process in some situations).
7. § 412 (permitting the Attorney General to classify an alien as being under suspicion of
terrorist involvement, meaning that this alien may be held for up to seven days for questioning;
thereafter, the alien must be either charged with a criminal or immigration laws violation or be
released).
8. Id.; see David Cole, EnemyAliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953,960-66 (2002) (examining the
sweeping preventive detention of aliens).
9. In addition to far-reaching detainment terms, the Act has other far-reaching provisions.
For example, to obtain wiretap authority before the Act was implemented, foreign intelligence
collection must have been the only purpose of an investigation. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B),
1823(a)(7)(b) (2000). Under the Act, intelligence agency officials are now given wiretap authority
from a special intelligence court if foreign intelligence operations are a "significant purpose" of the
investigation. USA PATRIOT Act § 218; see John E. Branch III, Statutory Misinterpretation: The
Foreign Intelligence Court of Review's Interpretation of the "Significant Purpose" Requirement
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2075 (2003). The Act additionally
criminalizes the possession of any material that could potentially be used non-peacefully,
particularly as a component of a biological or chemical weapon. USA PATRIOT Act § 817.
Criminal sentences for committing acts of terrorism and for harboring or financing terrorists or
terrorist operations have also been increased. §§ 802-815. Also, before the Act, authorities were
required to obtain new individual search warrants for each district within which they searched. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41 (a) (2000) (amended 2001). The Act permits these authorities to acquire nation-wide
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in the power to detain individuals without the supervision of independent
appraisal.' In short, a cornerstone of the USA PATRIOT Act is the power
to detain in terms that may seem arbitrary and capricious without some
form of further review and supervision. The problem with preventative or
investigatory detention is that it may be subject to abuse without
independent review of the grounds for detention." Preventative detention
is a method that may be abused by government, and represents precisely
the problem that the United States Constitution was meant to control and
regulate: namely, that the freedom of the individual is protected by the rule
of law from arbitrary or capricious action by governmental authority. In
international human rights and in comparative constitutional law, the
principle is well established that emergency measures enacted under
conditions of crisis must nonetheless be measures that are reconcilable
with the culture of a democratic society based on the rule of law.'2
search warrants for terrorism investigations. USA PATRIOT Act §§ 219-220. Restrictions on
information sharing have been lifted in order that intelligence officers and criminal justice officials
could be permitted to share intelligence gathered during the course of each agency's ongoing
investigations. See § 203. Subpoenas have also been made far more available for electronic
communications, including e-mail communication, transmitted by terrorism suspects. See § 210.
Moreover, the Act has lifted restrictions on telephone taps so that rather than monitoring a specific
telephone line, authorities may now monitor any telephone used by a person suspected of
involvement in terrorism. § 206. The Act is equipped with a "sunset" provision which requires the
enhanced surveillance powers created by the Act to expire four years after the Act is implemented
(in 2005). § 224.
10. § 412. See generally Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (prohibiting persons detained by the
Secretary of Defense from seeking relief outside a military tribunal).
11. The USA PATRIOT Act also directs a branch of the United States Department of Justice,
the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), to furnish Congress with semiannual reports regarding
claims of civil rights and civil liberties abuses perpetrated by Department of Justice employees. §
1001. On July 17, 2003, the OIG delivered to Congress such a report, 2003 which detailed that the
OIG had received 1,073 complaints of civil rights or civil liberties abuses in connection with
actions taken under the USA PATRIOT Act. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
6 (2003).
12. The International Law Association's Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms
in a State of Emergency are reprinted in Richard B. Lillich, The Paris Minimum Standards of
Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072, 1073-81 (1985). For a
comprehensive account of these minimum standards by the principal architect of the list, see
SUiBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY (1989) (providing, from
the perspective of the principal architect of the list, a comprehensive account of the minimum
standards); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
19-21 (1989) (stating that freedom from enslavement is a right that cannot be derogated by a state
of emergency). The three other human rights that cannot be derogated by a state of emergency are
the right to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from ex post facto laws. See American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 131-32.
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Professor Dinh's article, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, provides an
indirect scholarly justification for the far-reaching powers of the USA
PATRIOT Act. The title of his article, it should be noted, is not Patriotism
in the Age of Terror, but Nationalism in the Age of Terror. In recent
history, diverse appeals to nationalism as an ideological symbol of
solidarity have often been directed at the preemption or cooptation of the
symbols of patriotism and loyalty. Extreme examples include Joseph
Stalin's characterization of the war against Nazi Germany as the "great
patriotic war" of the Russian people.'3 Hitler's cooptation of the symbols
of nationalist Germany included the ethnic and ideological purging of
undesirable Germans. 4 Ethnically, those Germans not considered part of
the Herrenvolk, such as the Jews and the Romani, 5 were basically
candidates for extermination. Germans whose ethnic pedigree was
acceptable could nonetheless be repressed and persecuted because they
were liberals, socialists, communists, and political nonconformists. The
German concentration camps existed for them. For the ethnic undesirables,
there were the death camps. Joseph Stalin's camps seemed to roll labor
exploitation, slavery, and death into a single institutional form: the gulag.6
Such, then, are some of the egregious excesses of nationalism, pure or
adulterated. Moreover, many forms of right-wing authoritarianism in Latin
America and South Africa seemed to carry the notion that salvaging the
nation, and therefore national identity, was mandated by some version of
Christian ideology. In South Africa, the ideological justification of
Afrikaner nationalism was "Christian Nationalism."' 7 South African
13. See ALBERT SEATON, THE Russo-GERMAN WAR 1941-45 (1971). Russians refer to World
War II as the "Great Patriotic War" because when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, it
penetrated deep into Russia, where most of the worst fighting occurred. See R.R. PALMER & JOEL
COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 814-15 (6th ed. 1984); Craig R. Whitney, Shared
Space; Germany Again Forces a Redefining of Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1990, § 4, at 1. See
generally SOVIET GENERALS RECALL WORLD WAR II (Igor Vitukhin ed. & Anatol Kagan trans.,
1981) (describing decisive battles of Russia's "Great Patriotic War").
14. It has been argued that Hitler's use of such nationalist themes in his June 30, 1934 blood
purge inspired Stalin, who employed the same nationalistic tone throughout his own purge. See
W.G. KRIvrrsKY, I WAS STALIN'S AGENT 204-05 (1939).
15. The Romani are also referred to as "Gypsies." See generally GYPsY LAW: ROMANI LEGAL
TRADITIONS ANDCULTURE (Walter 0. Weyrauch ed., 2001) (compiling essays that describe various
aspects of Romaniya).
16. Stalin took deadly measures against the Kulaks during his murderous collectivization
campaign from the late 1920s to early 1930. See, e.g., NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF
RusSLA 551 (3d ed. 1977); see also ALEKSANDR I. SOLzHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO
1918-1956, at 54-57 (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1974) (also discussing the Kulaks).
17. CHARLES BLOOMBERG, CHRISTIAN-NATIONALUSM AND THE RISE OF THE AFRIKANER
BROEDERBOND IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1918-1914, at I (Saul Dubow ed., 1989). The Afrikaner
Broederbond--comprised of members of the National Party, the party responsible for implementing
apartheid legislation-was created to advance Afrikaner cultural, political, and economic dictates.
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opinion leaders explained that this form of nationalism was similar to
Italian Fascism 8 and German National Socialism. 9 We take up these
cautionary remarks not because we believe that national identity is by
itself an intrinsically good or bad thing. The central question about
national identity is what values are included in it, to embrace it as a
defensible moral basis for demanding solidarity, patriotism, and more.
American national identity is inextricably tied to the fundamental moral
principles that led to the formulation and development of the American
Constitution and the rule-of-law culture that it represents. A salient
question concerning United States foreign policy has been the extent to
which fundamental moral precepts borne of our constitutional experience
should not be reflected in our construction of foreign relations law,
national security law, and international law, including international human
rights law. An expectation held by many thoughtful observers of the
international scene is that a state with the immense power of the United
States must be seen to be the exemplar of its values in the international
community, and that its commitment to the international rule of law must
be as firm and consistent as its commitment to its own constitutional
values.2"
Not everyone agrees with this. Many Americans believe that the United
States must be exempted from the moral foundations of the international
rule of law.2' Many of them believe that, at times, our own Constitution is
Id. at xxii, 32-36, 228. The Broederbond was essentially the culmination of various Afrikaner
cultural organizations, such as the Afrikaner Taal Bewegung (Afrikaner Language Movement) and
de Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (the Society of True Afrikaners). See generally W. A. DE
KLERK, THE PURITANS IN AFRICA (1975) (recounting the Afrikaner people's attempt to remake their
particular world to conform to the concept of a rational plan from the radical right).
18. See generally HOWARD SIMsoN, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF AFRIKANER FASCISM AND ITS
APARTHEID POLICY (1980) (examining Afrikaner fascism in relation to a general theory of fascism).
19. PATRICK LAURENCE, THE TRANSKEI 13-14 (1976). The Status of the Transkei Act
denationalized black Africans from the Transkei region of South Africa. Id. at 10. This Act has
been compared to the denationalization statute passed into law by Germany's Nazi government in
1941, which stripped German Jews of their citizenship. Id. at 13-14.
20. This position evokes Vattel's Law, which articulates that some belligerent state behavior
quite exceeds the scope of itsjustness, which effectively robsjust causes of rectitude. Vattel posited
that a state is "a moral person having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, and susceptible
at once of obligations and of rights." Introduction to E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW § 2 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., special ed. 1993) (1758). Regarding
a state's engagement in warfare, which Vattel regarded as a right belonging to nations "only as a
remedy against injustice," Vattel admonished that it is "so terrible in its effects, so disastrous to
mankind, so hurtful even to him who makes use of it, that the natural law only allows it as a last
resort, that is to say, when justice can be obtained in no other way." Id. at bk. 3, § 51.
21. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND ITS
ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001) ("American exceptionalism has always had two sides: the one
eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message should
be ignored."). For an excellent, comprehensive analysis of American exceptionalism, see generally
IV&l 56
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an impediment to securing the vital national interest of our state and,
therefore, that many of its precepts may be set aside when they are
inconvenient. The war against terrorism in the aftermath of September 11
has thus posed profound questions about national identity, the rule of law,
and the appropriate role for the United States in the world community.
Part II of this Commentary begins by exploring the ostensible
underpinnings of Dinh's article by examining his understanding of
nationalism. Part III explains why crony nationalism is not the best defense
against global terrorism. Part IV then analyzes some significant United
States foreign policy undertakings that have arguably negatively affected
United States national security. Finally, in Part V we conclude by gleaning
lessons from problematic aspects of United States foreign policy.
II. PROFESSOR DINH ON AMERICAN NATIONALISM AND
GLOBAL TERRORISM
Professor Dinh's article seems, at least sub silencio, to provide a more
elaborate justification for derogations from the rule of law and
fundamental values found in the USA PATRIOT Act. His piece appears
to suggest that if we take patriotism seriously, then we must take national
identity seriously. If we take these two matters seriously, then identifying
with non-self nationals (i.e., others in the world community) erodes the
spirit of patriotism required by strong national identity to successfully
fight the war on terror. In this sense, his article may be seen as a
transparent effort to simply invoke national identity and national solidarity
as critical symbols of patriotism. Further, it may suggest that more
complex versions of the elements of national identity and the grounds for
solidarity in specific instances of application are themselves forms of
concern that fall short of what real nationality requires, what real citizen
obligations demand, and what real patriotism means for the citizens of the
United States.
Perhaps this is an unfair characterization of what Dinh has sought to
do. In effect, one construction of his piece could be that he has sought to
provide an academically respectable ideological gloss for the crude
appeals to patriotism by his mentors in the current administration. That
certainly is a possible perspective. However ineptly, he has raised an
important issue of both intellectual concern and public interest. That
concern is the question of the challenges to political identity under threat
of global terrorism. This seems to be an unexplored vista, and it cannot be
said that Dinh's piece takes us very far. However, it is important that the
complex and competing systems of identity are discussed in the context of
the war against terrorism.
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479 (2003).
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Let us clear the air on one matter; implicit and explicit in Dinh's article
is the idea that the current terrorist crowd represents something new on the
world scene.22 This is rubbish. Terrorism has been on the political
landscape of the modem era, even in the United States, for a very long
time. It has not been confined to non-state actors. The melancholy fact is
that both state and non-state actors engage in terrorism.23 Indeed, the Bush
Administration maintains that there was enough linkage of the Taliban
with al Qaeda to designate Afghanistan a terrorist state.24 Sometimes the
line between state-sponsored terrorism and non-state operatives is difficult
22. The title Dinh chose for his article, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, communicates his
belief that the climate associated with contemporary terrorism is new. In his title, Dinh purposefully
employs the definite article, "in the Age of Terror," as opposed to the indefinite article, "in an Age
of Terror," by which he ostensibly conveys the notion that September 11 ushered in a new age in
the course of human events that is characterized by terrorism. Dinh briefly alludes to the character
of the age preceding this new "Age of Terror," which he suggests reflected "world order"; he then
indicates that this "world order" may potentially be destroyed by the events of September 11, which
inaugurated the current age. See Dinh, supra note 2, at 867, 869 (discussing the "exceptional nature
of the [terrorism] threat" to the United States following the "September 11 ... wake up call", the
event which "marked a turn... [and] threatened the replacement of the world order with an era of
disorder"). Dinh even asserts that "the global community is currently navigating uncharted
territory." See id at 881.
23. Non-state actors' increasing sophistication is the source of much concern because the
future of terrorist attacks will assume a massive scope as these terrorists adopt the use of biological
and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to their strategy of activated hatred. See generally
PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA (1998). Contemporary threats to international
peace and security following September I I continue to fuel concerns that these powerful non-state
actors may also find refuge behind state protectors, who in turn invoke the principle that
sovereignty in international law does not permit intervention into the sovereign domestic
jurisdiction of a state. State victims of terrorist acts of aggression are reluctant to concede the
principle that they may be attacked without the prospect of legitimate self-defense for real security
concerns. After September 11, the Bush administration developed a national security doctrine with
important challenges to sovereignty, self-defense, the use of force, and the issue of intervention.
See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, WHrrE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. On
September 17, 2002, President Bush expanded his Administration's approach to the dangers posed
by all terrorists, whether state-sponsored or non-state-sponsored and whether with or without access
to WMD. See id. Specifically, President Bush declared that his "immediate focus will be those
terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts
to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors." Id. at 6. See generally
Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375 (2004) (examining historically significant national security
doctrines and the legal basis underlying the 2003 American attack on Iraq in order to explore the
Bush Administration's international policy determinations).
24. See, e.g., Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at a Reception for U.S. Senate
Candidate Jim Demint (July 23, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/07/20040726-2.html) ("Because we acted, Afghanistan ... ha[s] gone from [a]
terrorist state[] to [a] free, sovereign nation[] .... ); infra Part IV.A (entitled "The United States'
Foreign Policy Partially Facilitated the Creation of the Al Qaeda Terrorist Network").
[Vol. 56
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to establish. It has been said with some force that one person's terrorist is
another person's freedom fighter." The reality, however, does not
diminish the value of this insight. In the United States, there have long
been groups that have sponsored terrorism abroad while the United States
government turned a blind eye. Irish-American support for the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) yielded operations of terrorism that targeted the
people of the United Kingdom.26 Lord Mountbatten, a war hero, was a
victim of IRA terrorism." In truth, the United States' unwillingness to
constrain Irish-American support for Irish terrorism has long been a point
of discord between the United States and the United Kingdom.28 The
United States also supported the terrorist group in Nicaragua called the
Contras, whose own acts of terrorism were described by the World Court
as acts of aggression.29 The Soviet Union certainly had a terrible record of
25. BRIAN M. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 3 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of
assigning a lasting definition to terrorism, which produced the saying "one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter").
26. See JAMES ADAMS, THE FINANCING OF TERROR 134-38 (1986). Throughout the 1970s,
the IRA was almost entirely dependent on financial donations to support its ongoing terrorist
operations; the majority of these donations came directly from Irish-Americans living in the United
States. Id. at 134-36. To facilitate these donations, an organization was created and based in the
United States. Id. at 135. Irish Northern Aid contributed more than one half of all the finances used
by the IRA each year throughout the early 1970s. Id. at 135-36. Irish-Americans also donated
weapons to the IRA. Id. at 134.
27. Leonard Downie Jr., IRA Bomb Kills Lord Mountbatten, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1979, at
Al.
28. See Valerie Epps, Abolishing the Political Offence Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 203 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (discussing how relations
between the United States and the United Kingdom became strained as a result of cases in which
the United States refused to grant the United Kingdom's extradition requests for IRA members
accused of perpetrating terrorist attacks on British civilians and armed forces, including In re
Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), In re Requested Extradition
ofMackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17746 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), and In re
McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979)).
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). The World
Court condemned the United States for its covert paramilitary support of Nicaraguan Contras, in
an opinion based on official statements and United States government documents chronicling the
United States' involvement with the Contras. Id. at 39-44, 146-49. The Court held that the acts of
the Contras could not be imputed to the United States. Id. at 54. However, the court found that by
training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or
otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities
in and against Nicaragua, [the United States] has acted, against the Republic of
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to
intervene in the affairs of another State.
Id. at 146.
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state-sponsored terrorism in other people's backyards as well. ° Moreover,
the United States' ally in the war against terror, Pakistan, was the leading
terrorist training ground for the whole of Southeast Asia.3 India was the
primary victim-state of the Pakistan-sponsored terrorists.32 As we later
indicate in this Commentary, the United States was actively involved in
supporting, depending on one's point of view, liberation movements or
terrorist groups in the Middle East33 for the purpose of the ideological war
against the USSR. 4
From a comparative perspective, the problem with Dinh's form of
nationalism is that it is short on precisely what values are compatible with
a defensible domestic constitutional order and on the placement of that
order in a defensible world order. It may be that the major purposes and
values embodied in the United Nations Charter itself are among the most
important values, which should inform, infuse, and define national
identity, sovereignty, and peace within the framework of world order. At
the intellectual level, to raise the question of nationality and identity in the
context of global terrorism obviously raises a deeper question regarding
how systems of identity inform world order and world disorder. This is an
important question. If we take a position that in the United States national
identity is incompatible with the fundamental values of the larger world
30. See Secretary of State Alexander Haig, A New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy, Address
Before the American Society ofNewspaper Editors (Apr. 24, 1981), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1981,
at 6. The then-Secretary of State charged that "Soviet policy seeks to exploit aspirations for change
in order to create conflict justifying the use of force and even invasion. Moscow continues to
support terrorism and war by proxy." Id. Such support was manifested by Soviet use of chemical
weapons in Afghanistan, as well as by Soviet cooperation with Cuba to foment wars in Central
America. See John Norton Moore, Grenada andthe International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 145, 165-68 (1984). The Soviet Union also financed state sponsors of terrorism, including
Algeria and Syria, and it served as a sometime sanctuary for terrorists. See Abraham Abramovsky,
Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft
Part III: The Legality and Political Feasibility of a Multilateral Air Security Enforcement
Convention, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 464 (1975) (discussing the Soviet position on
aircraft hijackings). For an overview of Soviet interventions that tactically employed terrorism, see
Nagan & Hammer, supra note 23, at 411-12.
31. Pakistan was long home to numerous terrorist training camps that provided Osama bin
Laden with various operatives for his al Qaeda terrorist network. See YOSSEF BODANSKY, BIN
LADEN 49-51, 94-95 (2001).
32. India has accused Pakistan of waging a proxy war for the Kashmir region, for which
Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism by providing militants with terrorist training and allowing them
to cross the Line of Control. See SuMrr GANGULY, THE CRISIS IN KASHMIR 15-16 (1997). This
permitted the militants to infiltrate the part of Kashmir controlled by India, an act which violated
the existing, controlling bilateral treaty. See id.
33. The United States also has engaged in similar support for organizations in large parts of
Africa, Latin America, and Asia, but the space constraints of this Commentary do not allow for in-
depth analyses of these events.
34. See infra Part IV.
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community and world order, then we are probably caught in the trap of the
clash of civilizations: one group's national identity threatens the other
group's survival. Consequently, to use the popular version of this insight,
this amounts to the clash of irreconcilable civilizations, which of course
is the view of Samuel Huntington,35 shared as well by Osama bin Laden.36
To-better explore this ostensible clash, a few threshold insights into the
nature iof identity may be merited. Human beings are not born fully
conscious of any particular identity. They are born into families. The
families themselves maintain complex connecting ties with larger family
networks and community structures. The world of identity for any human
being revolves around how the essential "I" broadens to include the "we."
The "we" may be the family, the local community, the school, the state,
the larger federal union, the broader continental framework within which
the state is situated, or a still broader possible identification of the "I" with
humanity as a whole and with universal solidarity." Hence, there is a
tension between local and immediate symbols of identity and those of
broader, but vague, symbolic importance. A person may be a member of
a family, a citizen of Florida, and a national of the United States, and still
claim broader protections on the basis of human rights and
humanitarianism from the larger community and its responsibilities to the
individual. National identity is an important component of the identity of
the individual, but of course it competes with other forms of identity
reflecting the priority given to morality, ideology, and security. With these
35. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993,
at 22, 22. Huntington advances the notion that emerging in international intercourse is a new
structure of international relations, which centers on conflicts between groups from different
civilizations, particularly the different value systems held by two of the cultural blocs he identifies:
the Western and the Islamic. Id. at 29-32. In light of his extensive research on the subject,
Huntington has concluded that the wide cultural gap between the West and other blocs, again,
particularly the Islamic bloc, is essentially unbridgeable. See Samuel P. Huntington, The West:
Unique, Not Universal, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1996, at 28, 33-34, 37-39.
36. For an account of how Osama bin Laden effectively shares this viewpoint with regard to
his intense hatred for the West, particularly the United States, see generally JOHN CLARK MEAD,
THE NEW WORLD WAR: A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK AT WHY AND How MILITANT MUSLIMS
PLAN TO DESTROY WESTERN CIVILIZATION (2002). For a similar analysis in more general terms,
see generally ROBIN WRIGHT, SACRED RAGE: THE WRATH OF MILITANT ISLAM (200 1).
37. For various sociological standpoints on individual and collective identity with regard to
family, geography, education, sexual orientation, and other factors, comprising a sense of "I-ness"
or "we-ness," see, for example, JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 61-62 (1987); ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63-69 (John Keane &
Paul Mier eds., Temple Univ. Press 1989); RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER 39 (1970);
Verta Taylor & Nancy E. Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian
Feminist Mobilization, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104, 105 (Aldon D. Morris
& Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
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preliminary thoughts, let us review what Dinh has told us about
nationalism in "the Age of Terror."
A. Unpacking Professor Dinh 's Article
Dinh's article is divided into an introduction and four parts. The
Introduction sets out what Dinh believes is the current international
climate: what he calls "the Age of Terror," which he suggests began on
September 11,2001 3 Dinh's central premise throughout the article is that
"our world," by which we assume he means American civilization-all
lawmakers and academics, the workforce and soldiers-was forever
changed by the events of that tragic day, which he holds were
"unprecedented and unimaginable."39 September 11 was certainly a
terrible catastrophe for the United States; yet, it cannot be said that as a
victim state, the United States is unique as a target of terror. From a global
perspective, the practical problem historically has been the great
ideological conflict among hegemons and the strategic and tactical value
of their promoting terrorism in other people's countries. Perhaps this was
justifiable in the sense that it managed to avoid a direct conflict with
superpowers armed to the teeth with weapons of mass destruction. A
nuclear war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. would have been
the ultimate act of state terrorism, the result of which would have been the
destruction of the planet. In this sense, there are justifications for all the
surrogate wars fought in the name of the great ideologies of the late
twentieth century. However, we should keep in mind that the states that
experienced such surrogate warfare also experienced unprecedented and
unimaginable horror. This does not justify taking a sanguine look at the
terrorism of September 11; rather, it illustrates the need for a broad
approach to the problem of terrorism involving state and non-state actors,
where they are constrained by basic rules of international law regarding
the use of coercion to achieve political objectives.40
Part I of Dinh's article is a brief outline of the evolution of sovereignty
in international law.4 We consider his analysis inadequate, and we refer
the reader to our own study of the subject entitled The Changing
Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International
Relations.42 In this section, Dinh lays the foundation for the remainder of
38. Dinh, supra note 2, at 867.
39. Id. at 868.
40. Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as "the unlawful use of force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2004).
41. Dinh, supra note 2, at 870-73.
42. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming Nov.
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the article by hinting at existing challenges to sovereignty. Specifically,
Dinh offers a list of factors that augur "the increasing irrelevance of the
sovereign nation-state." '43 This list comingles Dinh's perceived challenges,
such as the international community's increasing appreciation for
international organizations with the existence of weaker failing states,
commonly referred to as "terrorist states" by the Bush Administration. The
difficulty of making a critique of Dinh's second factor is his complete
unfamiliarity with serious international law. It is not that these insights are
wrong, it is that they are produced anecdotally: they have virtually no
sense of the context, the challenges, the frameworks within which evolving
constitutional orders are developing in the international system, or the
threats to that system. Dinh's invocation of the sovereignty idea appears
merely to separate it from the bad guys in the international community
who are terrorist groups that, consequently, either subvert or attack the
concept and practice of sovereignty.
Part II of Dinh's article argues that non-state actor terrorist groups
should be seen as analogous to an extended version of the outlaw concept
of the Wild West." He points out that terrorists with access to war-making
mechanisms who employ them to attack the structures of world order
compromise the nation-state's near monopoly over the use of force. In the
specific case of the "war" waged by al Qaeda, this is a direct attack on the
sovereignty of the United States."5 Because terrorist groups have access to
lethal instruments of war-making, they cannot be viewed as ordinary
criminals.46 It is unclear whether there exists a category that delineates
how terrorists should be treated under the law; the implication seems to be
that the terrorist group functions outside the concept of community and
that accordingly, no restraints can be placed on a sovereign state in the war
against terrorism.47 This seems to be an indirect way of justifying a kind
of suspension of the Bill of Rights, human rights, and humanitarian law in
the fight against terrorism.48 Dinh gives us a tour of how a terrorist fights
2004).
43. Dinh, supra note 2, at 873.
44. Id. at 874-75.
45. Id. at 875.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. This philosophy is reminiscent of official sentiments that emerged during the Cold War
regarding what standard of conduct the United States should adopt to counter the Soviet threat.
Perhaps, philosophically, it was best reflected in a 1954 intelligence committee report supervised
by Lieutenant General James Doolittle, the acclaimed war hero who led the 1942 raid on Tokyo.
CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR 190 (2002). Specifically, Doolittle wrote that:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed
objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are
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and of why such fighting falls outside the normative guidelines established
by regular criminals who, according to Dinh, operate within the system of
acceptable criminality.49 Dinh then provides a sense of what he means by
the term "terrorist. 5 0
Part III of Dinh's article is an appeal to the importance of national pride
in the fight against terrorism." This is quite clever. According to Dinh, in
being American, every citizen must discover that each has a moral stake
in all aspects of the national community's domestic and international
activity.52 Dinh cites criticisms of the importance of nationalism and
acknowledges the validity of dissenting voices, but he suggests that each
critic undervalues the sovereign nation-state as part of the architecture of
world order.5 3 This is facile nonsenseY.5 The endangered nation-state is
essentially a straw man. Here, the reader really gets a sense of Dinh's
distaste for the concept of a global community. What Dinh is really getting
at is his own antipathy to the principle that nation-states too are subject to
the rule of law and are themselves part of the international constitutional
system based on the United Nations Charter. Dinh uses a rhetoric designed
to promote patriotism in his target audience. Unfortunately for Dinh,
professionals and intellectuals tend to be moved by coherent arguments
and restrained language rather than by crass appeals to pride and
patriotism. Dinh is essentially endorsing old-fashioned isolationism:
antipathy to a concept of an international community and to United States
responsibilities within that community. He refers to writers skeptical of
international solidarity and responsibility, such as Michael Walzer, who
asserts that he is "'not... aware that there is a world such that one could
be a citizen of it,'" and Edmund Burke, who champions the importance
no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not
apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of 'fair play'
must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage
services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more
clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us.
It may become necessary that the American people will be made acquainted with,
understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE AcITIEs, S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. I, at 9 (1976) (quoting a report related to the
1954 Hoover Commission Report on government organization written by Doolittle).
49. Dinh, supra note 2, at 874-75.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 875-79.
52. Id. at 876-77.
53. Id. at 877.
54. See infra Part III for a critical analysis.
55. Dinh, supra note 2, at 877-78 (quoting Michael Walzer, Spheres ofAffection, in MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY? 125, 125 (Joshua Cohen ed., 2002)).
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of localism by "'lov[ing] the little platoon."'' 6 It is an interesting
invocation of the authority of parochialism in an age when vast global
forces have generated a fixation on globalism as a critical condition of
world order. He also approves of Michael McConnell's claim that ' [w]e
will not love those distant from us more by loving those close to us
less."' 57 Apparently, Dinh believes being a citizen who identifies with
humanity as a whole requires a citizenship that effectually rejects national
identity and compromises national pride. This is startling nonsense. The
normal appeal to patriotism is the exploitation of insecurity in the context
of terrorism. Dinh's article seeks to rhetorically disguise the fear factor
and to promote the pride factor: if we have pride in our country, then we
shall be proud of the war against terrorism; if we are proud of the war
against terrorism, we will of course give unqualified support to the
Administration's agenda, and we shall then qualify as real national
patriots.
Dinh completes this part of his article with a slippery line of reasoning,
which tenuously ties the goal of international solidarity to statelessness,
which he then connects to terror. Essentially, Dinh suggests that the future
implications of a global community with universal ideals are as follows:
the road to universal cosmopolitanism is paved with good intentions, but
to be effective, such cosmopolitanism requires the rejection of national
identity, which is tantamount to statelessness; statelessness would break
the bond of community and brotherhood among geographically proximate
people situated within national boundaries, and it would possibly inspire
these individuals to pursue selfish motives; consequently, it follows that
some of these "rudderless," 8 self-interested people may find the
"community of terror" '59 enticing. We take issue with this line of reasoning.
Later in this Commentary, we shall offer an alternative viewpoint, which
explains the origins of some of the terrorist forces we are fighting, and that
better comports with historical and contemporary evidence.
In Part IV of his article-as an afterthought-Dinh simply presents a
checklist of the United States government's reactions to the war on terror.
The information in this section was not part of Dinh's original Dunwody
Lecture and it is vastly removed from his appeal to nationalism and
sovereignty as the critical lever against terrorism. In truth, one does not
need an invalid form of nationalism or state absolutism to pursue these
strategic and tactical measures in combating terror as it now threatens the
56. Id. at 878 (quoting EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 39
(Frank M. Turner ed., 2003)).
57. See id. (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Don't Neglect the Little Platoons, in
NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 78, 82).




United States. Although Professor Dinh has apparently had an opportunity
to review the evidence, he regrettably seems-like some of his
colleagues-to be immune to the unpleasant world of fact. As Dunwody
Lecturer, Dinh had the opportunity to explore deep issues and craft
reasonable, constructive conclusions about the threat posed by the current
war on terror, but we believe that he did not. He instead reinforced the
fictions of crony nationalism.6' Thus, in this Commentary we provide a
deeper analysis of a major issue in the war on terror-the unintended ways
in which states have promoted violence, including terrorism, to achieve
short-term political objectives, resulting in a legacy of dangerous actors,
brutal institutions, and lasting instability. We hope that an analysis of the
roots of this legacy may yield valuable lessons about the threats posed by
current forms of terrorism.
B. The National Security Discourse in the Aftermath of
September 11
The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act was characterized by speed,
haste, and, apparently, a complete lack of an informed national discourse,
ostensibly motivated by the notion that crisis required expediency.6' This
expediency compromised thoughtful and critical self-appraisal in light of
the most fundamental values of our constitutional and political traditions.
Conditions of crises test the nature and quality of our political and legal
order. It will doubtless be recalled that during the period of the Cold War,
a crisis emerged based on the assertion by politicians like Senator Joseph
McCarthy that communist infiltrators were everywhere. At least that
paranoia there was fed by the fact that the other side was in fact totalitarian
and had serious weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems to make
those threats real. This does not justify the paranoia, but perhaps the
excesses of Senator McCarthy and his cohorts are easier to swallow in
light of that context. Nonetheless, the excesses associated with the
exploitation of the security environment left deep scars on the nature and
quality of American democracy and fundamental principles of decency.
The process revealed many dirty, rotten scoundrels, and it created a
climate of suspicion, which came to be linked to the idea of a state under
the domination of national security operatives. Of course, we cannot wish
national security threats away. These threats are real. But it is also the case
that changes in governance and weakening the rule of law do not
strengthen the foundations of national identity or democratic political
culture-in fact, they weaken it. Therein lies the challenge. We need
60. See infra Part III for a more in-depth discussion of crony nationalism.
61. See Palmer, supra note 5, at 2533.
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national security as much as we need a defensible moral order and a
vibrant political culture. It is precisely these values that the terrorist seeks
to destroy. We, including Professor Dinh, must therefore resist the
temptation of performing according to the terrorist's predilections. It is
important to deter and to stop terrorist operations. It is also important to
demolish the ideas and the ideologies, however demented, which fuel
terrorism. The high moral ground should never be conceded to the
terrorist; if that happens, it constitutes a major victory for the forces of
terrorism and darkness.
Professor Dinh rhetorically seeks to exhort his target audience to
uncritically rally to the banner of his so-called "pride" and so-called
"patriotism."'62 As we have indicated, we need carefully to consider how
deeply rooted the indices of pride and patriotism are in the American
Revolution, the foundations of the American Constitution, and the
historical experience of America as a leading force of enlightenment in the
world community. We shall focus on a series of important events
underlying the existing war on terror from an analytical standpoint and
offer insight into how policymakers dealing with the threat might better
approach its rectification.
III. CRONY NATIONALISM Is NOT THE BEST DEFENSE
AGAINST TERRORISM
We have borrowed the phrase "crony" from the claims of those who
believe that concerns about American capitalism are really concerns about
crony capitalism,63 which is not good for the economy. Similarly, it may
be that the crony patriotism, and therefore the crony nationalism, that
Professor Dinh seems to promote and defend is likely to lead us to a dead-
end in the war against terrorism. The issues are deeper, more complex, and
more challenging than he is able to present. We suggest that the specific
issue of identity includes the issues of nationalism and patriotism, but
more importantly, it also requires a deeper appreciation of the moral,
historical, and pragmatic indicators that should infuse these ideas as
critical to the war against terrorism. More than that, the war against
terrorism is also a war of ideas, ideologies, and moral precepts, and these
too are components of the systems of identity that inform those who seek
to destroy terrorism as well as those who, however covertly, seek to
62. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 2, at 876-77.
63. "Crony capitalism" is the phrase used to describe public-sector regulatory authorities'
tendency to render assistance to their friends in the private sector. See John Plender, Western Crony
Capitalism, FiN. TiMES (London), Oct. 3, 1998, at 10 (criticizing the relationship between such
officials and their private-sector comrades). See generally BRUCE COGGINS, DOES FINANCIAL
DEREGULATION WORK? 11-30 (1998) (critiquing the economic views of deregulation proponents).
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promote and defend it. Dinh does not take us very far into this analysis.
There are important concerns lurking in the interstices of his internal
perspective that must be more carefully assayed.
In Part III of his article, Dinh condenses his perspective on the
importance of nationalism-both his view of its general worth as well as
its nature as the tool to fight terrorism-in the following sentences:
"[L]oving our country... allows us... to love others more.... Loyalty
to our nation.., fosters a commitment to universal principles. [But with
regard to establishing a "worldwide community of human beings,"' ] [i]t
is not at all evident that rejection of national identity would foster global
brotherhood .... "" It is important to note that we agree with part of
Dinh's argument-that local commonality and harmony helps to facilitate
global commonality and harmony-but his claim that true international
solidarity is essentially impossible is problematic. The overarching
problem with the whole argument is that Dinh does not develop it; he
urges the reader to love one's country, which might lead to a more
extensive kind of love, but there he ends the argument. Dinh does not
complete the thought, which intuitively places importance on loving
others. Instead, he truncates the thought and offers a fragment to the
reader, implying that this is a complete argument. Let us examine this
more carefully.
Dinh's argument in Part III of his article rests on the dubious
assumption that being a citizen nationalist and being a citizen of the world
are mutually exclusive. If Dinh implies that nationalism is an important
symbol of identity capable of being developed from more parochial
foundations, then implicit in broadening the foundations of an individual
political identity is the idea that nationalism is an important symbol for
expansion. If political identity may be similarly expanded, it can certainly
be expanded to become more inclusive so that the self includes the idea of
identification with mankind as a whole. However, he asserts that he is "not
sure that the destination justifies the journey,"" which intimates his belief
that the eventual achievement of global solidarity is either impossible or
not worth the effort to even try to bring it about. Dinh never considers that
it might be possible to be a citizen of the world without rejecting national
identity. Instead, a citizen of the world can adopt priorities that transcend
national boundaries in order to achieve transnational harmony, which is
arguably reconcilable with the concept of nationalism.67 Indeed, Dinh
64. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in NUSSBAUM, supra note 55,
at 1, 4-5. Dinh also quotes Nussbaum's phrase. Dinh, supra note 2, at 877.
65. Dinh, supra note 2, at 879.
66. Id. at 879.
67. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617,
618 (1997) (reconciling cosmopolitanism with nationalist patriotism). For a fascinating
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suggests that the best way to work toward international harmony is to work
within the construct of the nation-state system.
The problem with Dinh's analysis is that he has not begun to
understand the full range of participants within the international
community, much less the importance of these actors for either enhancing
or depreciating global security. The central problem with the nation-state
is the problem of limiting absolute sovereignty and enhancing the principle
of cooperative sovereignty within the framework of the United Nations
Charter and international responsibility. This has nothing to do with either
parochialism or globalism. It is concerned with how local matters may be
functionally and practically decided and managed locally, and how global
matters, which affect all, may be handled cooperatively and intelligently
through bilateral, multilateral, and other forms of cooperation. The
dynamic of global public order yields refinement techniques regarding the
importance of locating public order decisions at the appropriate level of
actual decisionmaking. Loose abstractions are no substitute for concrete
analysis.
Dinh overuses the term cosmopolitanism; his antipathy to it smacks of
a return to a crude form of nativism. Today, liberal theory addresses the
complexity of reconciling nationalism with more inclusive systems of
identity, and part of this complexity is the implicit difference between
globalization and internationalization. Globalization is the overarching
process of denationalizing political, economic, and social regimes.6" Dinh
reconciliation of the perceived liberal universalism underlying global cosmopolitanism and the
supposedly contrary disconnectedness associated with nationalistic proclivities, see generally YAEL
TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993).
68. Martha Nussbaum evidently subscribes to globalization-oriented cosmopolitanism, which
is likely why Dinh cites to several assertions of hers. See Nussbaum, supra note 64, at 4.
Nussbaum's account of the cosmopolitan viewpoint seeks to displace the focus of civic education
from national citizenship to world citizenship. Id. at 6. Her understanding of the cosmopolitan
model of citizenship appeals to scholars and other debate participants who believe that the best way
to achieve universal moral norms is to draw all human beings into a single broad community. Her
essay, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, encapsulates this moral philosophy, which she apparently
realizes is not well grounded in the contemporary reality of international law and international
relations. See id. at 15-17. This explains why, time and again, her work reads like a catalog of
suggestions for future generations as to how global solidarity might eventually be achieved. For
example, she advises that nation-states should eventually establish a series of international
institutions, including, among various other proposals:
a world criminal court.., to deal with grave human-rights violations; a set of
world environmental regulations, with enforcement mechanisms, plus a tax on the
industrial nations of the North to support the development of pollution controls in
the South; a set of global trade regulations . . . ; a set of global labor
standards... [; and] forms of global taxation [to transfer] wealth from richer to
poorer nations.
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fears the challenge of such inclusive systems of identity. Conversely,
internationalization refers to cooperative activities of public and/or private
national actors on a level beyond the nation-state, and at times under its
control. 69 Dinh does not refer to this approach at all. Internationalization
is also a stop-gap toward more comprehensive understanding of
international relations, but it presently functions as an ideology that
promotes the value of the nation-state, while fostering international
solidarity valued by the international law scholars who support cooperative
sovereignty.
Thus, it is possible to be a citizen of the United States and a citizen of
the world community. Moreover, this understanding may be crucial in
assisting humanity to work toward larger peace and solidarity efforts than
ever before, such that national identity may eventually be a starting point
to a more comprehensive idea of what citizenship truly means. Given
enough timeline, this realization may eventually inspire individuals to
continue to unify until being a citizen of the world might be realizable in
a literal sense. The character of citizenship is indeed changing; we shall
momentarily address the extent to which this change is under way. We
must note that we are not suggesting that establishing a global democracy,
d lU Martha Nussbaum's professed dream,70 is even remotely possible at
this stage of human development, despite the evolving nature of
citizenship. However, we regard Dinh's apparent attempt to undermine
global solidarity as counterproductive and in ideological opposition to the
very scholars to whom he cites in Part III of his article.
A. Re-reading Part III of Dinh 's Article: A Closer Look at
His Portrayal of Nationalism
Employing the concept of nationalism to advance an argument---or, in
other words, creating a nationalistic movement-has long been a wise
political strategy to garner support for a course of action, but only if it is
Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice, An Olaf Palme
Lecture Delivered in Oxford 32 (June 19, 2003) (transcript available at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/hathaway/files/Tanner2ROK.doc) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Beyond the
Social Contract].
69. For an eloquent take on how this school of thought is practically applied, see Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process After September l1th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 337,
339-44 (2004) (explaining how "transnational legal process" triggers state interpretation of
domestic law in accordance with global standards, the result of which is that these states internalize
global standards into their domestic law).
70. While Dinh believes that Nussbaum "does not necessarily advocate for [a world state],"
Dinh, supra note 2, at 878, we believe that given her extensive writings on the subject of global
solidarity, it is rather clear that she does. See Nussbaum, supra note 64, at 4-5; Beyond the Social
Contract, supra note 68.
[Vol. 56
DUNWODY COMMENTARY
done correctly.71 Generally, the movement that can point to genuine
injustice and demonstrate that nationalistic action is a valid response can
run the gauntlet of heavy scrutiny and emerge with its validity intact.
However, if the merits of such a nationalistic movement are vaguely
asserted, the nature of the movement tends toward illegitimacy (even if the
reasons are valid), for if the underlying claim cannot be sustained, the
movement is rendered invalid. Dinh posits that nationalism is the path the
United States must take to overcome the terrorist threat. Unfortunately,
Dinh does not do justice to the concept of nationalism in his analysis
because his arguments champion illegitimate or crony nationalism.
To give substance to his argument that nationalism is the best weapon
in the war on terror, Dinh seeks to establish the importance of his
perception of nationalism. To do so, in Part III of his article, Dinh draws
from the work of a series of scholars, including Ernest Renan, Wilfred
McClay, Michael Walzer, Edmund Burke, Michael McConnell, and
Walter Berns.' Dinh portrays these scholars' arguments in an almost
exclusively crony nationalistic way; in other words, the crux of Dinh's
argument is that these scholars' writings show that nationalism is far more
utilitarian than any form of international cooperation. In re-reading the
works of these scholars, we find implications inclined more toward
international cooperation than Dinh would apparently have his audience
believe. Let us briefly examine these implications.
71. Arguments concerning the importance of nationalism with regard to various specific
movements abound, as do philosophies purporting to decipher its complexities and their connection
to such movements. See generally Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination,
87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990) (discussing the moral justification for nationalism); Yaei Tamir, The Right
to National Self-Determination, 58 Soc. REs. 565 (1991) (arguing for a cultural interpretation of
the right to national self-determination). Many of these arguments harmonize with regard to the
recognition that culture is the central characteristic of nationhood, a concept that authors of various
nationalistic movements, like Dinh, attempt to develop. See Tamir, supra, at 586-87. Tamir
identifies six fundamental assumptions that tie cultural identity to the concepts of nationalism and
self-determination: 1) the connection to a cultural group is a necessary human interest; 2) the
interest in such a connection is significant and intense; 3) the ability to express such an interest in
public as well as in private is essential; 4) public space to experience this interest is necessary; 5)
the ability to regard one's community as an expression of one's national identity is essential; and
6) national self-determination necessitates political independence. Id. For an additional excellent
analysis of the evolution of the concept of nationalism, see generally BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED CoMMUNIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed.
1991); E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS ANDNATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1992). See also JOHN BREUILLY,
NATIONALISM AND THE STATE (2d ed. 1993) (providing a systematic description of nationalism as
a form of politics).
72. See Dinh, supra note 2, at 876-79.
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Dinh portrays Renan's renowned essay, "What is a Nation,"73 as a
crony nationalist account. Renan's essay is useful to this discourse, and
Dinh wisely draws attention to it, because of its forward-thinking
arguments. Dinh suggests that Renan's essay finds national identity at the
root of the concept of community,74 yet we read it differently. Dinh's
reading proclaims that national boundaries are the thread that holds
together the fabric of global society,75 while we see that Renan may
actually mean that common values and human nature bind individuals to
each other. By removing the concept from the nineteenth-century context
in which it was written7 6 and giving it a modem reading, we believe it is
possible to cross-apply Renan's analysis to arguments that are global in
scope. One of the most important and oft-quoted concepts in Renan's
essay is this: "the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many
things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things."77 In
other words, the core characteristics of what Renan designated "a nation"
are: 1) his perception that a group of individuals with common values
comprises a nation; and 2) that these individuals have "forgotten many
things," by which Renan suggests that all peoples of"a nation" are subject
to the same imperfections-a defining attribute of humanity. Now, armed
with the recognition of global values to which the vast majority of the
world now subscribes-international pacts, United Nations General
Assembly resolutions and declarations, and World Court judgments-as
well as the recognition that all human beings are subject to the same flaws,
we find it possible to re-evaluate Renan' s meaning by replacing the phrase
"a nation" with "the global community." The variables in the equation are
the same; yet, in light of the progress made by humanity since Renan's
time, we now understand that when computed, they yield a different
product.
Wilfred McClay's pro-nationalistic statement regarding the importance
of absolute loyalty to one's nation" is as passionate a statement as Stephen
73. Ernest Renan, What is a Nation?, Lecture Delivered at the Sorbonne (Mar. 11, 1882), in
NATION AND NARRATION 8 (Homi K. Bhabha ed. & Martin Thorn trans., 1990).
74. Dinh, supra note 2, at 876.
75. Id.
76. Indeed, Renan's essay also suffers from some dated thinking, which must be excised from
its still-useful portions so that an application of Renan's rationale to contemporary world events
might retain its viability. For example, it is difficult to reconcile Renan's observations about the
usefulness of brutality in shaping utilitarian political associations. Specifically, Renan wrote that
"historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political
formations... [because] [u]nity is always effected by means of brutality." Renan, supra note 73,
at 11. The passage of time and the peaceful establishment of governments, such as in South Africa,
the Czech Republic, and Romania, have rendered this and similar arguments moot.
77. Id.
78. Dinh, supra note 2, at 877 ("'For patriotism. ... like any love, withers and dies if it is not
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Decatur's.7 9 However, Dinh failed to mention that McClay generally
recognized the inherent danger of absolute adherence to jingoistic
conceptions and advocated what might be called a thinking allegiance.
McClay wrote of the concern had by left-leaning intellectuals, inspired by
World War II, that mass societies possess the dangerous capability of
engaging in unthinking allegiance to the state. Specifically, in The
Masterless: Selfand Society in Modern America, McClay wrote that "mass
society [has] a dangerous social potential for unparalleled forms of
domination, as Hitler had just made vivid by his success in imposing his
authority upon the German populace."'8 McClay seemingly suggests that
such unthinking allegiance is unacceptable in any form, which may be
interpreted to mean that while dedication to one's nation is certainly
essential in general, mass societies ought not to give instinctive assent, or
acquiescence, to their national government under some circumstances.
Dinh apparently rejects this scheme because it does not comport with his
conception of necessary patriotism, a core tenet of his crony nationalism.
Thus, we agree with Dinh that allegiance to one's nation-state is, by and
large, necessarily reflexive; but we differ from him in that we believe this
allegiance is premised on the nature of the nation-state's position in the
international community, which Dinh does not address.
Dinh mentions Michael Walzer's critique of cosmopolitanism,8 which
is not as pointed as Dinh apparently would have his target audience
believe. Walzer seems to suggest that loving one's fellow local citizens is
a starting point toward the greater imperative of global solidarity, as
opposed to being the alpha and omega of citizenship.82 While Walzer
certainly has obvious distaste for the phrase "citizen of the world," he
nevertheless recognizes the overarching necessity of being part of the
global community."3 Walzer does justice to the concept of legitimate
nationalism, which he regards as important because "we begin by
understanding what it means to have fellow citizens and neighbors;
without that understanding we are morally lost. Then we extend the sense
of moral fellowship and neighborliness to new groups of people, and
accorded some degree of instinctive assent.'" (quoting Wilfred M. McClay, America-Idea or
Nation?, PUB. INT., Fall 2001, at 44, 53)).
79. Dinh, supra note 22, at 876 ("'Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may
she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong."' (quoting Commodore Stephen
Dacatur, Toast at a Dinner in Norfolk, Virginia (Apr. 1816), in ALEXANDER SLIDELL MACKENZIE,
LwE OF STEPHEN DECATUR 295, 295 (1848))).
80. WmH.RED M. MCCLAY, THE MASTERLESS: SELF AND SOCIETY IN MODERN AMERICA 219
(1994).
81. Dinh, supra note 2, at 877-78 (citing Walzer, supra note 55, at 125).
82. See Walzer, supra note 55, at 125-27.
83. See id.
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ultimately to all people."" Dinh's analysis of Walzer's acerbic quote that
he is "'not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen
of it"'85 cuts short the apparent meaning of Walzer's piece as a whole:
despite the grammatical failings of the phrase "citizen of the world," the
underlying unity it suggests, which is prized by advocates of international
cooperation, should be the goal of every individual in every nation on
Earth. Thus, Dinh is correct that nationalism is important, but in the grand
scheme of human relations, he appears to have ignored Walzer's point that
it is a means to an ultimate goal: the unification of all individuals.
Dinh similarly invokes Edmund Burke's "little platoon" arguments to
shore up his own contention that "much as we like to think globally, we
love locally., 8 6 Dinh's analysis of Burke's argument is partly correct, but
incomplete. Dinh focuses his audience's attention on the first part of the
Burke quote, which advises individuals to "love the little platoon."'87 This
portion of the quote exhorts individuals to devote their allegiance to their
immediate neighbors and government, and Dinh strives to keep his
audience's attention there. However, his audience's attention should also
be focused on the last part of the Burke quote, which suggests that loving
the little platoon "is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward
a love to our country and to mankind."88 Dinh manipulates this section to
support his own contention that it is most important to pledge one's
allegiance to what is local, from which the incidental effect of respecting
what is global might additionally be derived. However, what Burke
evidently meant was for his "little platoon" analogy to delineate steps in
a process; loving the little platoon is only the first step toward the ultimate
good, which is to "proceed toward a love to our country and [then proceed
toward a love] to mankind." 9 Dinh was correct that loving what is local
is important, but Burke stressed that even more important is to "proceed"
or graduate to the next step, leaving the previous step behind. To Burke,
this process culminates with love for mankind, a goal that advocates of
international cooperation have long worked to achieve.
To best discuss Dinh's use of Michael McConnell's analysis of Burke's
"little platoons," we must first briefly introduce the traditional way in
which individual relationships are academically understood. Famed
sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies differentiated individuals linked by kinship
ties, racial connections, or religious associations, from individuals that
84. Id. at 126.
85. Dinh, supra note 2, at 877-78 (quoting Walzer, supra note 55, at 125).
86. See id. at 877-78 (quoting BURKE, supra note 56, at 39).
87. See id. (quoting BURKE, supra note 56, at 39).
88. BURKE, supra note 56, at 39; see McConnell, supra note 57, at 79 (suggesting that
Edmund Burke did not consider patriotism and cosmopolitanism to be at odds).
89. See BURKE, supra note 56, at 39.
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form relations for popular, functional, mercantile, or political benefit.9"
Tonnies articulated this difference using the concepts of Gemeinschaft
(community) and Gesellschaft (society).9 The Gemeinschaft is comprised
of sanguinal or organic relationships, while contractual or artificial
relationships comprise the Gesellschaf.92 Tonnies's categorization did not
expound on any link between these two categorizations.
Michael McConnell, on the other hand, advances the communitarian
position, which holds that a discernable connection exists between
personal associations and local associations.93 In other words, a continuum
exists with, for example, kinship ties (personal associations) on one end
and nation-state identification (distant associations) on the other.94 Because
this continuum is essentially a series of concentric circles, events that
affect the more immediate personal circles radiate out and affect distant
circles. Indeed, communitarians are obligated not only to focus their
attention on the innermost circles, but also to work their way outward to
the outermost circles.95 McConnell believes that despite the connection he
recognizes, cosmopolitanism is still problematic and, like Dinh, he argues
that the best way to promote concern for distant individuals is first to
foster affection for local individuals.96 We believe that based on the nature
of the connection as it is articulated by McConnell, it is possible to view
it broadly so that it can encompass a national, societal, and perhaps even
a global scope. Thus, simply by broadening McConnell's understanding
of what comprises a distant association, his model functions as an accurate
reflection of the international climate.
Presumably, Dinh cites to Walter Bems's book, Making Patriots,97
because the entire book is an argument that patriotism is in itself of key
importance, as opposed to being important as a means to a greater end.9"
The greater end is, as Dinh perhaps unintentionally put it, "lov[ing] others
more."99 Berns's book is excellent reading, for it chronicles the history of
patriotism, from Rousseau and Locke's deliberations on how a social order
powered by commercial interests might be sustained, to the contemporary
importance of patriotism in uncertain moral times."° Berns's examination
90. FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNrrY & SOcmTY 33-34 (Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans.,
Harper & Row 1963).
91. Id. at 33.
92. Id.
93. McConnell, supra note 57, at 79-80.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 79.
97. Dinh, supra note 2, at 878-79 (citing WALTER BERNS, MAKING PATRIOTS 50 (2001)).
98. See generally BERNS, supra note 97.
99. See Dinh, supra note 2, at 878-79.
100. See generally BERNS, supra note 97.
20041
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
of how value-driven concepts like liberty and natural rights inspire such
allegiance among citizens of the Unites States °'' serves as a useful
reminder to his readers to be grateful for the freedoms we Americans enjoy
because of the policies of so many scholars and because of the sacrifices
of so many soldiers. If Dinh correctly interpreted Berns's thoughtful
examination of American patriotism to show that Americans should unite
to defend their national identity rather than more universal principles, then
Bems's analysis suffers from the same shortcomings as Dinh's. However,
we interpret Berns's message differently than Dinh does. We see that
Berns offers an insightful analysis of how legitimate patriotism-not crony
patriotism-has historically functioned as a secular mechanism to bring
together a country full of disparate immigrants. 2 It is possible to read
Bems's book as laudatory not only of the United States, but also of the
process of bringing together diverse groups of people, which is the aim of
individuals advocating international cooperation.
B. Reflections on the Changing Character of Citizenship
Dinh's understanding of citizenship is the traditional view that it
involves "a notion of stateness."' °3 However, this perspective is slowly
being outmoded as a debate emerges regarding how the concept of
citizenship might better be understood. While scholars and other
intellectuals possess divergent views on the subject, a non-traditional view
of citizenship is gradually gaining prominence. This new perspective
disputes the idea that citizenship is inextricably linked to "stateness," and
it holds that the concept of citizenship is progressively taking on a non-
national character.'" This changing character of citizenship is rooted in the
identifiable shift in current events away from purely domestic phenomena
toward happenings that affect nation-states but exceed traditionally
imposed nation-state boundaries. In other words, international events and
increasing multilateralism have had the effect of slowly shifting citizens'
identification away from the nation-state. Indeed, the slow evolution of the
concept of citizenship is ongoing; citizenship is "no longer unequivocally
anchored in national political collectivities. ' '
Among the many scholars who have explored the changing character
of citizenship, international law scholar Thomas Franck lays out an
excellent conceptual framework. He argues that the steadily increasing
101. See, e.g., id. at 23-46 (discussing how freedom of religion contributes to patriotism).
102. Seeid.
103. ANTJE WIENER, 'EUROPEAN' CTZENsHnP PRACTICE 27 (1998).
104. See Yasemin Nohuglu Soysal, Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making:




intensity and ubiquitousness of transnational communication have created
a new international environment of personal and professional
connectedness.1 °6 Specifically, Franck asserts that "[d]ramatically
multiplied transnational contacts at all levels of society have not only
resulted in a greater awareness of the global context, but also have created
new commonalities of identity that cut across national borders and
challenge governments at the level of individual loyalties."' 7 He believes
that what is slowly transpiring is "a global system characterized by
overlapping communities and multivariegated personal loyalties yielding
more complex personal identities."' '
International law scholar Richard Falk has also written extensively on
the subject.0 9 Falk builds on Franck's framework in his investigation of
the gradual integration of individuals all over the world for a variety of
reasons and has identified various alliances as examples of "global
citizenship.""' 0 His characterization of this phenomenon is both positive
and negative, depending on the context of the unification. For example, he
regards the forward-looking phenomenon of international activism, which
he argues has taken on a non-national character,"' as a positive form of
"global citizenship.""' 2 On the other hand, he regards with disdain the
unification of individuals around the world for business and economic
gain, although he also regards this group as one citizenry. He asserts that
this group amounts to a fiscal citizenry because it "shares interests and
experiences... [and because members] have more in common [with each
other] than [they do] with the more rooted, ethnically distinct members of
[their] own particular civil society. ' 113 His aversion to this form of global
citizenship is blatant when he discusses its damaging effect: "[T]he result
[of this manner of global citizenship] seems to be a ... global elite that




For better or for worse, the international climate of citizenship is
certainly changing," 5 and though Dinh seems to recognize it, the tone of
106. See Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
41, 43 (1997).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 63.
109. See generally Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS 39
(Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993) (discussing the forms of global citizenship).
110. Id. at 40-48 (generally referring to associations of individuals from various geographic
locations as a "global citizenship").




115. It is important to note that although citizenship is ajuridical bond between the individual
and the state, the current international system makes a powerful claim that the individual is the
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his article suggests that he would rather ignore it. While the emphasis Dinh
and other scholars place on nationalist citizenship is presently not in
danger of being wholly shifted to an international regime, Dinh must
nevertheless come to grips with the reality of the gradually changing
character of citizenship. Generally referring to this emerging context,
Warren Magnusson wrote that the cosmopolitan outlook "decenters the
state as the object of political analysis, [however] it does not ignore the
state or pretend that it is about to wither away."'" 6 Yet, according to Robin
Cohen, it is far too late to "return the genie of social identity [exclusively]
to the bottle of the territorial nation-state.""' In short, to complete the
concept cut short by Dinh, the nature of citizenship is changing so that
while loving one's country is vitally important to the betterment of one's
immediate and national environment, it is not the most important kind of
love; the betterment of the international environment to benefit all peoples
is most important. Indeed, not loving others, but loving all is the ultimate
goal.
IV. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBAL TERRORISM
It is easy to refer to the catalog of guiding principles underlying the
actions taken by the United States government abroad, be they initiated by
Congress in accordance with the Constitution or by the Executive Branch
in other circumstances, as American foreign policy. This is true both when
those principles are used to advance the United States' national interests,
including independence, economic well-being, territorial integrity, and
national security considerations, and when the principles are ostensibly
used to comply with the self-appointed affirmative obligation assumed by
the United States to better the international climate when such action is
either required or convenient. When discussing American foreign policy,
it is almost always necessary to refer to it in non-specific, typically
emotional terminology because of the sheer amount of information the
phrase conveys. "' It is difficult to encapsulate the exact nature of the many
bearer of duties based on the concept of international human rights. While this is not necessarily
the same as citizenship, the fact that it confers rights and obligations on the individual from the
international community as a whole promotes the idea of an emergent form of citizenship, which
identifies the individual with the global community.
116. WARREN MAGNUSSON, THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL SPACE 281 (1996).
117. Robin Cohen, Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers, 72 INT'L
AFF. 507, 520 (1996).
118. In 1953, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that "the purpose of our
foreign policy is to maintain and foster an environment in which our national life and individual
freedom can survive and prosper." DEAN ACHESON, THIS VAST EXTERNAL REALM 19 (1973); see
President John F. Kennedy's Address in Salt Lake City at the Mormon Tabernacle, I PUB. PAPERS
733, 736 (Sept. 26, 1963) ("[T]he purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own
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strategies and interests that compete for primacy within this very general
categorization, and we do not seek to do so in this Commentary. Rather,
we seek to identify three of the United States government's most
significant foreign policy undertakings that have negatively affected
United States national security. We do not seek to attribute fault, for these
policy undertakings resulted in "blowback""' 9 in Democratic and
Republican administrations alike, and the problems inherent in these
policies transcend partisan and petty differences. Rather, our purpose is to
learn; we believe that only by exploring these policies may we come to
understand how, in the language of the CIA, some interventions simply
"blew back" and, thus, how to craft a more constructive foreign policy in
the future.
Officially, the United States has long been opposed to international
terrorism. 2 ° That is the official myth. Everyone officially opposes
terrorism. The operational reality has been different. Covertly, the
superpowers confronted each other through surrogates as each tested the
other's willingness to defend its own spheres of influence, including
security influence, around the globe. This meant collaborating with
questionable groups. Because these groups were questionable, the
operations typically were covert. Unfortunately, such covert interventions
had unanticipated or unpredictable long-term effects, some of which were
detrimental to the United States' national interests. The United States'
foreign policy has from time to time indirectly been implicated in the
problems of terrorism. For example, the United States supported Jonas
Savimbi, the guerilla leader from Angola.' From the point of view of
most Angolans and other Africans, Savimbi was an opportunistic
terrorist." in the context of Nicaragua, the United States supported the so-
called Contra national liberation group.' To most Nicaraguans, the
sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world."); GEORGE F. KENNAN,
The Two Planes of International Reality, in REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 3, 4 (1954)
("[A] political society... conducts foreign policy in order to live."). Other scholars have attempted
to encapsulate American foreign policy into easy-to-digest rules for the Executive. For example,
Professor Theodore Lowi offers that Executive exercise of American foreign policy powers ought
to evince "secrecy, unilateral action, energy, commitment, [and] decisiveness," owing to the
breakneck pace of international relations, Theodore J. Lowi, Presidential Power and the
Ideological Struggle over Its Interpretation, in THE CONSTTUTION AND THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 227, 238-39 (Martin L. Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991).
119. See Thomas Henriksen, The "Blowback" Myth, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 15,2001, at 25.
120. See Fred Hiatt, Our Rose-Colored Cold War, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at A19
(remarking on the gradual convergence between the foreign policy ambitions of the United States'
current anti-terror policy and the United States' long-term Cold War-era anti-terror policies).
121. Jon Jeter, Angolan Rebels' Hit-and-Run Strategy, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at Al6.
122. See Ian Fisher et al., Chaos in Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, § 1, at i.
123. See Atrocities Reported in Contra Raids, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1987, at C2.
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Contras were nothing but a terrorist, thug-like operation.'24 In light of the
current terrorist crisis, which has its roots in United States-Middle East
policy, we carefully examine several situations in which the expedience of
United States policy has resulted in enhanced threats to the United States.
In short, levels of intervention designed to enhance the security of the
United States seem in the long term to actually have made the United
States more vulnerable. We examine three specific situations: Afghanistan,
Iran, and Iraq. 2 '
A. The United States' Foreign Policy Partially Facilitated the
Creation of the Al Qaeda Terrorist Network
In late December 1979, the Soviet Union unlawfully invaded
Afghanistan to support Afghanistan's failing communist government.'26
124. Among other examples of such questionable foreign policy undertakings, we first
considered the United States' dealings with CIA-paid Panamanian General Manuel Noriega, such
as his collaboration with General Oliver North, which lasted until he lost the United States' support
and was consequently removed from power, taken prisoner, tried, and convicted in a Miami court
on charges of drug trafficking. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(upholding the court's jurisdiction to hear the charges against Noriega), aff'd, 117 F.3d 1206 (11 th
Cir. 1997) (upholding both the lower court's finding that it had jurisdiction and Noriega's
conviction for drug trafficking). See generally STEVE ALBERT, TIE CASE AGAINST THE GENERAL
(1993) (recounting the American trial of Noriega); Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under
International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1991) (arguing that the
United States' invasion of Panama, which resulted in the arrest of Manuel Noriega, violated
international law). A second such undertaking was the United States' support of Contras to
overthrow the Sandanista government in Nicaragua. See generally DAVID NOLAN, THE IDEOLOGY
OF THE SANDINISTAS AND THENICARAGUAN REVOLUTION (1984) (describing the events leading up
to and following the Nicaraguan Revolution); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SANDINISTA ELECTIONS IN
NICARAGUA (1984) (discussing the background to the 1984 Nicaraguan elections); Arturo J. Cruz,
Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 1031 (1982-83) (lamenting the loss of
democratic ideals in the Sandanista government). The third undertaking we considered was CIA
involvement in the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, after which General
Augusto Pinochet assumed power. See generally PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA,
ANATIONOFENEMIES: CHILE UNDERPINOCHET (1991) (providing a study ofChilean society under
Pinochet's military rule); POuL JENSEN, THE GAROTTE: THE UNIED STATES AND CHILE, 1970-1973
(1989) (describing how the United States contributed to the end of the Popular Unity Government
in Chile); EDY KAuFMAN, CRISIS INALLENDE'S CHILE (1988) (studying Salvador Allende's United
Popular government in Chile); Lois HECHT OPPENHEIM, POLITICS IN CHILE (2d ed. 1999)
(explaining the political history of today's Chile, focusing on the Allende and Pinochet years).
125. We chose these three foreign policy undertakings in light of the connections they
manifest to the continuing terrorist threat as discussed by Dinh. Had more space been available, we
would have pointed out other such unsuccessful undertakings in other contexts. See supra note 124.
126. A 1973 military coup overthrew the last Afghan king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, and
brought a Marxist regime to power, led by pro-Soviet Mohammad Daoud Khan. ANTHONY HYMAN,
AFGHANISTAN UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION, 1964-83, at 27-30 (1984). Daoud had previously
served as Afghan Prime Minister from 1953 to 1964 and had relied extensively on Soviet aid; as
self-appointed President, he officially established firm ties with the Soviet Union. Id. However, by
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The Mujahedin, an organization of militant Islamic fundamentalists, the
name of which translates to mean "those who struggle," '27 emerged to fight
the Soviet incursion. As part of the roll-back of Soviet communism,"'2 the
foreign policy of the United States was specifically crafted to support
Mujahedin operations throughout the Soviet war for Afghanistan through
extensive financial assistance and arms purchases in the name of furthering
United States interests in the region.29 Specifically, between 1986 and
1989, the United States donated more than one billion dollars 30 to the
Mujahedin and provided Mujahedin fighters with several hundred
late 1977, Daoud had moved away from his previously pro-Soviet stance and had decreased Afghan
reliance on Soviet assistance. ANTHONY ARNOLD, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION IN
PERSPECTIVE 63-65 (1981). He simultaneously sought to strengthen his own grip on power by
eliminating opposition within his party. HYMAN, supra, at 66-68. His obstruction of leftist Afghani
political movements set in motion a communist coup-the Saur Revolution-led by the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan. ARNOLD, supra, at 62-66. This radical political organization,
headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, and Amin Hafizullah, toppled the Daoud
government on April 27, 1978; Daoud was executed in the process. Id. at 65-66. Taraki and Karmal
were thereafter installed as president and deputy prime minister, respectively, and though Taraki's
government proclaimed a return to Islamic principles and Afghan nationalism, Taraki nevertheless
welcomed Soviet assistance by signing a twenty-year treaty of cooperation and friendship with the
U.S.S.R. HYMAN, supra, at 85-92. In September 1979, Taraki was ousted by former radical
compatriot Amin, who maintained Soviet ties. Id. at 152-55. However, Amin's radical policies soon
turned the population of Afghanistan against his rule, and both the regime's security as well as
Soviet interests in the region were imperiled. See id. at 155-59. Finding their position in
Afghanistan imperiled, the Soviet leadership decided to invade the country. Id. at 159.
127. See JASON ELLIOT, AN UNEXPECTED LIGHT: TRAVELS IN AFGHANISTAN 31 (2001).
128. Soviet "roll back" was long an aspect of United States national security doctrines. See
Nagan & Hammer, supra note 23, at 394-401. The policy culminated in the 1980s, when policy-
makers during the Reagan Administration believed that the U.S.S.R. was vulnerable and could thus
be militarily challenged in various parts of the world. Id. at 397. "The Reagan Doctrine was
designed to move from containment," which was an important characteristic in previous United
States national security doctrines, "to encroachment, which effectively attempted to roll back Soviet
ideological and territorial influence." Id. at 397-98. The Reagan Doctrine is credited with the
downfall of communism because the arms race it pushed eventually ended with the "missile gap"
favoring the United States. See JAMES HUBERT McBRIDE, THE TEST BAN TREATY 13-21 (1967).
Put simply, as a result of the arms race, the United States spent the U.S.S.R. into bankruptcy.
129. In response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter declared: "An
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled
by any means necessary, including military force." President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union
Address, I PUB. PAPERS 194, 197 (Jan. 23, 1980). The Carter Doctrine was purported to be a self-
justifying doctrine in that it derived its lawfulness from its articulated promise to defend
governments from external aggression.
130. David Rogers, Aidto Afghan Rebels Wins Approval ofa House Panel, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 1990, at A20; see also Ahmed Rashid, Accord on Afghanistan Overtaken by Events,
INDEPENDENT (London), May 28, 1990, at 6 (describing a possible agreement in May 1990 between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. to cut off arms supplies in the Afghan civil war).
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shoulder-held, laser-guided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. 3' The war for
Afghanistan became a war between fundamental Islam and the Soviet
Union; militant Islamic fundamentalists, including Osama bin Laden,
rushed to join the fight against the U.S.S.R.'32 In the name of fighting
communism, the United States essentially worked with bin Laden's
organization by concurrently funding Mujahedin projects with bin Laden
and advancing Mujahedin causes designed to assist bin Laden and others
like him in Afghanistan. For example, in 1986 the CIA and Osama bin
Laden mingled funds to develop a tunnel complex in Khost, a town
approximately 150 kilometers south of Kabul, to serve as a weapons
repository and training area for Mujahedin fighters. '33 Moreover, the CIA
pledged to increase the ranks of the Mujahedin; all in all, the CIA recruited
and transported to Afghanistan more than 35,000 "radical Muslims from
around the world" to fight the Soviet Union. 13
The Mujahedin continued this fight against the U.S.S.R. for nine years,
fifty thousand Soviet troops and between 1.5 and 2 million Afghans were
killed in the process. 35 Eventually, the Soviet Union was defeated and
driven out of Afghanistan; the United States, having achieved its goal of
Soviet containment, summarily discontinued its vast support not only for
the Mujahedin, but for the rest of the Afghan population. 36 The United
States' withdrawal of support was met with surprise and frustration by
much of the Afghan population. 37 Afghans viewed their participation in
the war as an integral cog in the machine that brought down the Soviet
Union, and they perceived betrayal in the sudden disappearance of United
States support. 131 Many of these frustrated Afghans, particularly some
members of the Mujahedin, eventually joined bin Laden's terrorist
131. AHMED RASHID, TALBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL
ASIA 129 (2000); Milton Bearden, Afghanistan Graveyard of Empires, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec.
2001, at 17, 20-21.
132. See Rod Nordland & Jeffrey Bartholet, The Mesmerizer, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at
44, 45.
133. Id.
134. RASHID, supra note 131, at 129-30.
135. See ELLIOT, supra note 127, at 30.
136. From 1955 to 1978, total humanitarian aid contributed by the United States to the Afghan
public amounted to approximately fifty times less than the amount given to the Mujahedin during
the war. See Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis, REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 15 (2)
(UNHCR, 1996). Even the little remaining support for the Afghan public dwindled further after
1992. See generally Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, U.N. ESCOR,
52d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/64 (1996). See also Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Afghanistan Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Felix Ermacora, in Accordance with the
Commission on Human Relations Resolutions, U.N. ESCOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/21
(1985).
137. ELLIOT, supra note 127, at 24, 30-32.
138. See id. at 160, 181, 197.
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organization.'39 Indeed, the United States was seen as the cause of the
ensuing unrest following the expulsion of the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan because the United States "enthusiastically pour[ed] arms and
strategists into the Soviet conflict and then fail[ed] to come up with the
magnanimous healing gesture that might have prevented ... civil war."' 40
In other words, many Afghans felt betrayed by the United States'4 ' because
of the speed with which the United States' attention was diverted away
from Afghanistan, and this was the raison d'tre for the emergence of the
Taliban. The United States' withdrawal created a power vacuum that
various clashing factions of Mujahedin sought to fill, the result of which
was "banditry and lawlessness."' 42 The Taliban, an organization of
religious scholars, responded by initiating a resistance movement.141 With
the promise of peace, stability, and a return to Islamic principles 44 in the
devastated, chaotic region, the Taliban rapidly attained prominence and in
1996 it became the de facto government of Afghanistan. 4 As the Taliban
took hold, the spirit of jihad that galvanized the Afghan Mujahedin in
opposition to the Soviet Union was redirected against the United States.
The Taliban transformed Afghanistan into a bastion of institutionalized
human rights violations'46 and a hotbed of terrorist training. The Taliban
139. See Stephanie Nolen, Is This the End of the Taliban? Regime's Backers Say Kabul's Fall
Merely Signals Shift to Guerrilla Warfare, GLOBE& MAIL, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al.
140. Jason Goodwin, Beyond the Back of Beyond, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Apr. 8, 2001, at
10 (reviewing ELLIOT, supra note 127).
141. See ELLIOT supra note 127, at 24 ("The Americans had washed their hands of
Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal and left ordinary Afghans with a widespread
feeling of having been abandoned .....
142. Id. at 22.
143. See KAMALMATINUDDIN, THETALBAN PHENOMENON: AFGHANISTAN 1994-1997, at 10-
11(1999).
144. See Emily MacFarquhar, The Rise of Taliban, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 1995,
at 64 (stating that Taliban leader Maulavi Mohammad Omar asserted that the Taliban sought to
restore peace to Afghanistan).
145. See Greg Myre, Taliban Score Military Victories, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Sept. 28,
2000, available at 2000 WL 27212354 (reporting that as of September 2000, the Taliban
purportedly controlled over 95% of Afghanistan). For a detailed account of the Taliban's
ascendancy to power, see generally MICHAEL GRIFFIN, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE TALIBAN
MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (2001).
146. The Taliban punished individuals charged with the commission of most any crime
according to the regime's extreme construction of Islamic law. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY
HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998 (Feb. 26, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global
/human rights/1998_hrpreport/afghanis.htm. To illustrate, those found guilty of murder would
be publicly executed, typically by throat-slitting, which was at times carried out by a member of
the victim's family. Id. Adulterers were usually publicly stoned or whipped to death. Id. Anyone
found to have committed a homosexual act would be "crushed by having walls toppled over them."
Id. Additional human rights violations included all manner of amputations, political killings,
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regime was implicated in numerous acts of terrorism because under it,
Afghanistan served as a haven for terrorists. 4 7 Even so, the country was
not categorized as a "state sponsor[] of terrorism" because the United
States refused to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan.'4 Nevertheless, the State Department recognized that after
the United States-backed Mujahedin expelled the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan, the country became "a breeding ground for extremists and
terrorist groups."' 49 Perhaps the most notorious among these terrorist
organizations taking refuge in Afghanistan was al Qaeda.
The al Qaeda terrorist organization was also a disastrous result of the
Anglo-American collaboration to contain Soviet communism. When the
United States and the United Kingdom encouraged tens of thousands of
Muslim radicals from forty-three Islamic countries in the Middle East,
Northern and Eastern Africa, Central Asia, and the Far East to travel to
Afghanistan and fight with the Mujahedin against the Soviet Union, al
Qaeda was essentially born. 5 These Mujahedin, along with other
transplanted and domestic militants, became al Qaeda. 5 One of these
recruits was Osama bin Laden, who in 1989 became the head of the al
Qaeda terrorist organization.'52 Bin Laden's organization was born out of
Afghan hatred of the West, which was the result of the perceived betrayal
discussed above, and was allowed to develop because of the power
vacuum also discussed above. In other words, the al Qaeda organization
originated with an American and British call-to-arms against the Soviets,
but it then became a network to train militant Islamic terrorists to fight all
Western acts by Western governments-particularly the United
States-perpetrated by Western actors, 53 to whom al Qaeda operatives
kidnappings for ransom, other forms of torture, institutionalized rape, arbitrary detention, and
pillaging. See id. Moreover, the Taliban took sexual discrimination to an unprecedented extreme.
Policies included imposing stringent dress requirements and corresponding punishments for
breaches, such as public lashings, finger, hand, or limb amputations, public stonings, and
executions of women for a variety of offenses, including transgressions as seemingly nominal as
the failure to correctly wear a veil or burkha so that all skin was completely covered. See id.
147. Ben Barber, Iran Tops U.S. List ofActive Terrorists, WASH. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at Al3.
148. Id.
149. Thomas H. Henriksen, The Rise and Decline of Rogue States, 54 J. INT'L AFF. 349, 366
(2001). Eventually, however, the State Department under former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright regarded Afghanistan with particular concern because of its extensive connections to
terrorist organizations, see Nancy Dunne, Albright Warns US Travellers of Terror Threat, FIN.
TIMES, World News section, at 8, which essentially amounted to official recognition of Afghanistan
as a state sponsor of terrorism. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2000).
150. See RASHiD, supra note 131, at 128-32.
151. See id.




generally referred as "infidels."' 5 4 In retrospect, given the absence of
regulatory power to prevent their assemblage in Afghanistan, it is
unsurprising that these former Mujahedin militants remained in
Afghanistan, which became the terrorist network's headquarters. Also,
given the militant nature of the organization, it should additionally come
as no surprise that bin Laden named the organization al Qaeda, or
"military base."' 55 As a result of al Qaeda's extended stay in Afghanistan,
the Taliban and al Qaeda were extensively connected; bin Laden enjoyed
considerable influence with the Taliban regime, and the Taliban's hostility
became focused on the United States and its allies.'56
In short, the United States' foreign policy, which rightly sought the
roll-back of Soviet communism, was perpetrated in such a way that it
inadvertently laid the groundwork for the establishment of one of the most
destructive and hateful terrorist organizations in the history of mankind.
Had the United States been more particular about the kind of individuals
it sought to train and arm, the backlash from its disappearance in the
region following the fall of communism might not have been as harsh as
it was. Moreover, had the United States also taken a lasting interest in the
region and worked to unite the individuals in the region instead of totally
withdrawing, it would have been better situated to negotiate the power
vacuum and the Taliban might not have had the edge it needed to assume
control of the country.
B. The United States' Foreign Policy Facilitated the Continuing
Political Tension with Iran, the Result of Which is an Ongoing
Terrorist Threat to United States' National Security
In 1925, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (M.R. Pahlavi) became the
Iranian Crown Prince when his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, (R. Shah
Pahlavi) was crowned monarch of Iran by the ulama "7 The Crown Prince
was educated in Switzerland and subscribed to Western-oriented
reformation ideologies, despite his autocratic leanings." 8 Throughout his
formative years, foreign influence in Iran was significant; the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), owned by the British government, steadily
produced and marketed Iranian oil, which prompted Iranians to call for
154. See Adel Darwish, Targeting Fellow Muslims May Be One Step Too Far, INDEPENDENT
(London), Nov. 11, 2003, at 16. "Infidel" typically refers to all Muslims and non-Muslims of
"lesser" faith. Id.
155. See RASHID, supra note 131, at 132.
156. Id. at 139,
157. SANDRA MACKEY, THE IRANIANS 166-72 (1996).
158. See Nationmaster, Encyclopedia: Mohammad Reza Pahlvavi, at
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Mohammad-Reza-Pahlavi (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
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nationalization of the country's oil fields.'59 The Allied occupation of
western Iran forced his father into exile in 1941, so M.R. Pahlavi assumed
the Peacock Throne and became the Shah."o
By the late 1940s, Mohammed Mossadegh, a socialist attorney and
member of the Majlis, or parliament, emerged and become renowned both
for his marked desire to wrest governing power from the Shah in favor of
a socialist government and for his endorsement of the popular desire to
step up Iranian control over its oil industry.' 6' The oil control issue came
to a head in 1949, when another lucrative oil contract with the AIOC was
negotiated. 162 In that same year, the issue of national control reached a
fevered pitch when the Shah attempted to manipulate the Maflis
elections. 63 In response to the Shah's mismanagement of the Iranian
military and his continuing cooperation with the West, an organization
called the National Front emerged, led in part by Mossadegh.' 4 In April
1951, public pressure prevailed and Mossadegh was appointed Prime
Minister. 165 He would answer the popular call to nationalize the Iranian oil
industry166 as part of a rapid process of power consolidation from 1951 to
1953,167 which led Mossadegh's leftist party to win the national election
of 1952-Iran's fledgling attempt at democracy-and thus ostensibly to
depose the Shah. 168 At first, the United Kingdom sought either to pressure
Mossadegh into an AIOC settlement or to have him removed from
government office. 169 In 1953, to safeguard Western interests, the United
States collaborated with the United Kingdom to intervene in Iran's new
democratic regime by way of a covert CIA operation that systematized
159. NIxu R. KEDDIE, ROOTS OF REVOLUTION 133 (1981).
160. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Iran, athttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/53 1 4.htm
(last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
161. Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran, 19 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 261,
262 (1987). Iranians were ill-treated and underpaid by the AIOC; they were forced to pay high
prices for their own oil and were given no influence in how the company was managed. See
KEDDIE, supra note 159, at 132-33.
162. See KEDDIE, supra note 159, at 133.
163. See Stephen Cohen, Conditioning US. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 260 (1982).
164. MACKEY, supra note 157, at 196.
165, GARY SICK, AL. FALL DOWN: AMERICA'S TRAGIC ENCOUNTER WITh IRAN 6 (1985).
166. Id. For doing so, he was designated Time Magazine's "Man of The Year" in 1951.
STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH'S MEN: AN AMERIcAN Coup AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST
TERROR 132 (2003).
167. SICK, supra note 165, at 6.
168. Id.
169. Gasiorowski, supra note 161, at 263.
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protests and dissent to overthrow Mossadegh's government 7 ° and reinstall
the pro-West Shah as national leader. 7'
United States policymakers were induced to act in Iran to stem the
spread of communism; the Cold War was raging by the beginning of the
1 950s, and the Soviet Union was actively searching for ways to expand its
campaign of dominance."7 The strengthening of the Western alliance was
offered as part of President Eisenhower's election platform so that upon
his election, his Administration embarked on a course of action to
overthrow Mossadegh and roll back Soviet expansionism.173 Concerned
that Iran's pro-Soviet Communist party, the Tudeh, was positioning itself
to gain control of the country 74 and disturbed by Mossadegh's toleration
of this communist ideology, the CIA sent operative Kermit Roosevelt to
Iran for the purpose of undermining Mossadegh's government and
replacing Mossadegh with a Prime Minister more sympathetic to the
West.'75 Thus, the CIA formulated "Operation Ajax," which allowed CIA
emissary Roosevelt to forge covert alliances with the Shah, royalist
General Fazlollah Zahedi, religious leader Ayatollah Kashani,'76 and
agitator and gang ringleader Shaban Jafari for the purpose of toppling
Mossadegh' 77
Roosevelt's original design for Operation Ajax was comprised of four
steps. ' First, propaganda was to be disseminated to vilify Mossadegh. 79
170. See SICK, supra note 165, at 6-7.
171. RICHARD W. CoTrAM, NATIONALISM IN IRAN 332 (1979) (referring to this plan as "a
CIA-backed and in large part CIA-directed coup").
172. In 1947, foreign service planner George Kennan, under the pseudonym "X," see George
F. Kennan, After the Coup, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1991, at A4, published The Sources of Soviet
Conduct, in which he argued for "a long-term.., vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies." X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566, 575 (1946-1947).
173. See JAMES A. BILL, THE EAGLE AND THE LION: THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN
RELATIONS 87 (1988).
174. See id. at 80 (referring to "the Musaddiq national movement as 'one of the worst
calamities to the anti-Communist world since the Red conquest of China' (quoting Iran: Whose
Ox Is Nationalized?, TIME, Mar. 26, 1951, at 31)).
175. See generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT, COUNTERCOUP: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL
OF IRAN (1979) (detailing the planning and execution of Operation Ajax, a collaborative effort by
the United States and the United Kingdom in 1953 to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh
and restore the deposed Shah to power).
176. See MOHSEN M. MILANI, THE MAKING OF IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 40-42 (2d ed.
1994) (writing that even senior members of the Shi'ite clergy transferred their support to the Shah
as the coup persisted).
177. See BILL, supra note 173, at 86-94 (analyzing the 1953 Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA)-backed coup in Iran).
178. Gasiorowski, supra note 161, at 272. See generally Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen,
Operation 'Ajax'Revisited: Iran, 1953, 29 MIDDLE E. STUD. 467 (1993) (providing an account of
the 1953 coup that returned the Shah of Iran to power).
179. Gasiorowski, supra note 161, at 272.
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Next, political figures challenging Mossadegh were to foment public
unrest with Mossadegh's government and dissent in the Majlis.80 Then,
the Shah was to have Mossadegh dismissed by royal decree, and he was
to appoint General Zahedi to the post of Prime Minister. 181 As a final point,
efforts would be made to consolidate military support for the Shah and
Zahedi.' 82 However, Roosevelt's plan was accidently leaked to
Mossadegh, who subverted it.'83 As a result, the Shah fled to Iraq, Zahedi
went into hiding, and the possibility of ousting Mossadegh seemed to have
been extinguished. 84 However, ranking members of the Eisenhower
Administration, particularly brothers John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of
State, and Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, so strongly advocated regime
change in Iran 8 5 that Roosevelt shortly made another effort to instigate a
coup against Mossadegh' 86
Roosevelt encouraged Zahedi to come out of hiding and coaxed the
Shah to return to Iran.'87 On August 19, 1953, the coup attempt
succeeded, 88 and the CIA essentially remade the Iranian political design;
Mossadegh and many of his colleagues were taken into custody, 9 Zahedi
was appointed Prime Minister, and military supporters of the coup were
placed in command of Iranian forces. 190 The Shah brought autocratic rule
back to Iran and immediately embarked on a bold agenda to rapidly
Westernize Iran, which was met with significant American support and the
scorn of hard-line Islamic conservatives. 191
In direct response to the Shah's secularization efforts, Ruhollah




183. Id. at 273.
184. Id.
185. BILL, supra note 173, at 89.
186. Gasiorowski, supra note 161, at 273.
187. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POwER 469-70
(1992).
188. Gasiorowski, supra note 161, at 274-75.
189. See Jon Sawyer, US.-Led Coup in 1953 Continues to Reverberate, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, July 27, 2003, at F10.
190. BILL, supra note 173, at 98.
191. The Shah set out to secularize Iran. For example, the Shah raised the minimum age at
which girls could marry from nine years to fifteen years, he banned traditional Shi'ite practices,
such as temporary marriages, and he instituted the mandatory unveiling of women in 1936. See
MACKEY, supra note 157, at 261,298. He also provided for education and literacy training for both
men and women, and he granted women the right to vote, the right to prevent their husbands from
marrying an additional wife, the right to retain custody of their children, and the right to initiate
divorce proceedings in some circumstances. Id. at 261.
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exiled father,' 92 re-emerged with amplified fury and railed against the
Shah's policies and his embrace of Western influence. Khomeini's
hostility toward the reinstated Shah and his Western allies only intensified
as the Shah continued to introduce characteristically Western policies;
Khomeini notably resumed his extreme opposition to any enfranchisement
of women. 93 When the Shah advanced an elections bill in 1962, Khomeini
led a riotous protest against the Shah and demanded the re-Islamicization
of Iran, to which the Shah responded with great and bloody force, no doubt
contributing to the mounting widespread resentment among the
populace.' 94
Khomeini's fierce protest of a capitulations bill, which granted to
American soldiers immunity from Iranian jurisdiction, resulted in his
arrest and exile.' 95 While exiled in Iraq, Khomeini honed his radical
theocratic philosophy, which proclaimed the illegitimacy of non-theocratic
forms of government and advocated a government only led by Islamic
scholars. 196 His movement manifested "a radical departure from the
classical Shi'i view" and steadily gained a following among the Iranian
masses throughout the 1970s.' 97 The Shah's reign was indeed coming to
a close; in 1979, the Iranian public revolted and the West-supported Shah
was again ousted,'98 this time by Khomeini, who imposed a revolutionary,
anti-Western Shi'ite theocracy.' 99
The extent to which Iran embraced anti-Western ideology was not fully
appreciated by United States officials until after the extremely ill Shah fled
192. Khomeini condemned Reza Shah Pahlavi for refusing to permit Islamic scholars and
clerical members assume authority over actions of state, and he regarded secularization, particularly
regarding advancements for women, as gross violations of divine law. Khomeini favored "veils and
chadors, the full-length gowns"; he justified the "executions of homosexuals, prostitutes and
adulterers" by arguing that "'If our finger suffers from gangrene, what do you do? Do you let the
whole hand, and the body, become filled with gangrene, or do you cut the finger off?' Raymond
H. Anderson, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 89, Relentless Founder of Iran 's Islamic Republic,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1989, at BI 1. Khomeini regarded the Shah's attempt to empower Iranian
women as a move to destroy family life by promoting prostitution. See Azar Tabari, The Role of
the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics, in RELIGION AND, PoLrIcs IN IRAN 47, 66-67 (Nikki R.
Keddie ed., 1983).
193. SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN
IRAN 85 (1988).
194. Id. at 85-87.
195. BILL, supra note 173, at 156-58, 160-61; see HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS
1262 (1979) ("Iran under the Shah, in short, was one of America's best, most important, and most
loyal friends in the world.").
196. See MILANI, supra note 176, at 88, 90.
197. NAZiH N. AYUBI, POLmcAL ISLAM 147-48 (199 1).
198. See Nikki R. Keddie, Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective, in THE MODERN
MIDDLE EAST 601, 610-11 (Albert Hourani et al. eds., 1993).
199. See ARJOMAND, supra note 193, at 99 (referring to Khomeini's rise to power as "an
intransigently revolutionary movement").
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to Mexico; he urgently needed cancer treatment that was exclusively
available in the United States.200 Despite the obvious, potential problems
associated with allowing the deposed Shah into the United States, he was
nevertheless permitted.20' Just over two weeks after the Shah entered the
United States, militant Iranian students seized sixty-six American hostages
and the American Embassy in Tehran; in exchange for the hostages, they
demanded that the hospitalized Shah be extradited to Iran to stand trial.20 2
The events of what came to be known as the Iranian hostage crisis are
well-chronicled in the annals of American history.0 3 The other
repercussions of the Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power continue to haunt
all United States relations with the Iranian theocracy. Most Iranians,
particularly the leadership, do not fail to recall that the United States was
an instrumental part of the bloody coup that re-installed the Shah's
autocratic regime.2°" Nor do they fail to remember the financial aid and
military support provided to the Shah by the United States in exchange for
preferential trade status, oil interests, and perhaps most important to the
United States, forestalling the spread of communism. 2" Throughout the
reign of the United States-backed Shah, torture was rampantly perpetrated
by the Shah's secret police, as were imprisonment and exile, all of which
the United States ignored or deemed to be internal matters of state.20 6 To
200. PIERRE SAUNGER, AMERICA HELD HOSTAGE: THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS 15, 18-19
(1981).
201. See id at 24.
202. See Nora Boustany, Cleric Says Iran Wants Hostage Issue Resolved, WASH. POST, Aug.
9, 1991, at Al; Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, Iranians Seize US. Mission, Ask Shah's Return for
Trial: 100 Hostages Taken After Student Attack, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1979, at A 1.
203. For a detailed account of the events leading up to the Iranian hostage crisis and President
Carter's reaction, see generally ROBERT D. MCFADDEN ET AL., No HIDING PLACE: THE NEW YORK
TIMES INSIDE REPORT ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS 258 (1981). President Carter arrested all oil imports
from Iran and froze all Iranian assets located in American banks. Id. President Carter also stopped
military spare-parts shipments to Iran, directed the Department of Justice to scrutinize Iranian
students who violated visa requirements, and had most Iranian diplomats expelled from the United
States. Id. at 258-60. President Carter eventually attempted to initiate a dialogue with the new
political infrastructure of Iran. See SALINGER, supra note 200, at 202-04. After limited success vis-
A-vis the release of the hostages, the President ordered American commandos to embark on a high-
risk rescue operation, which ultimately failed. Id. at 235-37. Following extensive negotiations for
the fifty-two remaining hostages, referred to as the Algiers Agreements and which lasted up to the
very last moments of the Carter Administration, the hostages were freed after 444 days of captivity,
and United States sanctions against Iran were terminated. See MCFADDEN ET AL., supra, at 292-
201. For examples of the terminated sanctions, see Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982)
(suspending legal claims against Iran pending in United States courts); Exec. Order No. 12,277, 3
C.F.R. 105 (1982) (transferring all Iranian assets held by the Federal Reserve Bank back to Iran or
to trust funds).
204. BILL, supra note 173, at 91-92.
205. Id. at 93.
206. See MACKEY, supra note 157, at 265,272-73,278 (discussing how the Shah's opponents
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the masses of Iran, the brutality committed by the Shah was brutality
tolerated by the United States. Eventually, these masses regarded the Shah
and the United States in an equally unfavorable light; in short, the Iranian
people felt betrayed by the United States.2"7
Simply put, the 1953 United States intervention in Iran re-instated the
Shah and displaced a democratically elected Iranian leader. The Shah
brought with him secularization and Western ideology; his efforts to
simultaneously secularize Iran and dispose of democratic groups opposed
to his rule led to the radicalization of dissent among the masses. This
dissent instigated Khomeini's transformation of the Shi'ite dogmatic law
of state from its original form into the radical form to which Iran still
adheres. °8 Author James A. Bill explains how the CIA's intervention,
Operation Ajax, lies at the heart of the United States-Iranian animosity that
continues to this day: Operation Ajax was a "covert operation [that] left a
running wound that bled for twenty-five years and contaminated
America's relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran following the
revolution of 19 7 8 -7 9 ."209 Arguably, if Iran's secular democracy had been
permitted to develop unhindered by foreign intervention, it might have
solidified under Mossadegh; had it been so, democracy, the very system
the United States advocates for the entire region, would already exist in
Iran, and it follows that the current theocratic, institutionalized Islamic
fundamentalism that permeates the country, which continues to threaten
the Middle East and the United States, would not have developed.
C. The United States' Foreign Policy Significantly Supported
Saddam Hussein 's Iraq
The monumental shift in the political make-up of Iran heralded a new
world of problems for the United States. Having completely Islamicized
the once pro-West Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini sought to spread this
Islamic revolution to other states in the region to effectively cast off all
Western influence in the whole of the Middle East.21 ° In response, the
United States embarked on a new undertaking: the containment of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The selfsame radicalized nation that the United
States inadvertently helped to create had become a chief threat both to
were forced into hiding or exile, and noting that President Carter championed the stability of the
Shah's Iran throughout protracted demonstrations of ubiquitous Iranian hostility toward the Shah's
regime).
207. See BILL, supra note 173, at 91-92 (discussing how the American-backed coup severely
damaged the credibility of the United States in the region for years to come); George Perkovich,
Mood Swing: In Iran, Whispers of Moderation, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1997, at CI.
208. See AIJOMAND, supra note 193, at 98-99.
209. BILL, supra note 173, at 86.
210. See MACKEY, supra note 157, at 288-300.
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United States interests in the Middle East and United States national
security.
Accordingly, the United States sought a new ally in the Gulf region,
and it found Iraq. Even though Iraq's ruling Ba'ath Party. maintained
contacts with the Soviet Union and ran a steadfastly socialist welfare
state,2 ' Iraqi leadership displayed marked hostility toward political and
religious rivals, particularly Iraqis who advocated communism.2"2 United
States architects of foreign policy thus felt that, given the nationalistic,
secular (though Sunni Muslim dominated) state's antagonism to
communism, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was positioned to be a powerful
regional ally against both communism and Iran. Indeed, on April 14, 1980,
five months prior to Iraq's September 22 attack on Iran, President Carter's
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, articulated the United
States' growing appreciation of Iraq: There exists "no fundamental
incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq... [and]
[w]e do not feel that American-Iraqi relations need to be frozen in
antagonism. '
211
The United States had extensive dealings with Saddam Hussein prior
to the escalation of hostilities between the United States and Iran.
Following the failed 1959 Ba'athist attempt to assassinate then-Iraqi Prime
Minister Abd al-Karim Kassim, 2 4 Hussein, who participated in the
attempt, escaped Iraq and fled to Egypt, where he cooperated with the
Cairo branch of the CIA by providing names of leftist Iraqi extremists. 5
The United States supported Kassim's overthrow chiefly because of his
leftist leanings.216 Specifically, Kassim had lifted a ban on the Iraqi
Communist Party,217 and in 1961 he pulled Iraq out of the United States-
sponsored 1955 Baghdad Pact which codified anti-communist policies."'
The United States could not risk losing support in the entire Gulf region,
211. See Eric Davis, The Persian Gulf War: Myths and Realities, in THE UNITED STATES AND
THE MIDDLE EAST 251, 266 (Hooshang Amirahmadi ed., 1993).
212. See id.
213. See Bob Levin et al., Iraq's Ambitious War Aims, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1980, at 37.
214. See Iraq; Facts on Saddam Hussein, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 18,
2003, at 995A1.
215. Geoff Simons, The Making of Iraq, LINK, Dec. 2002, at 1, 7, available at
http://www.ameu.org/uploads/vol35_issue5_2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
216. See ANDREW COCKBURN & PATRICK COCKBURN, OUT OF THE ASHES: THE
RESURRECTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 74 (2000). He also posed a secondary, though significant,
threat to the United States' interests in the Gulf, when he "threatened to occupy Kuwait and
nationalized part of the Iraq Petroleum Company." Id.
217. THOMAS POWERS, THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: RICHARD HELMS & THE CIA 128
(1979).
218. COCKBURN & COCKBURN, supra note 216, at 74; see also Pact of Mutual Cooperation
Between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of
Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact), Feb. 24, 1955, 233 U.N.T.S. 109.
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so, allied with Hussein and other Ba'athist Party members, the CIA backed
a 1963 coup in which Ba'athist operatives overthrew Kassim's regime.
219
Hussein then returned to Iraq as a Ba'athist Party intelligence official.
What followed since has been contested by various scholars, but some
believe that, upon his return, Hussein used the list of Iraqi communists and
leftist dissidents he assisted the CIA to compile to search for and destroy
pockets of resistance to the Ba'athist Party.220 Resistance continued, and
what remains uncontested is that Hussein was instrumental in both the
1968 coup that ultimately brought the Ba'ath Party back to power, as well
as in the regime's efforts to crush its opposition.22'
After Hussein became leader of Iraq in 1979, the United States
furnished him with significant material and military aid, effectively
nurturing Hussein's Iraq to become a pro-West secular stronghold to offset
the new, radical theocracy of Iran.222 As discussed above, Iran had designs
on the Islamicization of the entire Gulf region, and Iraq's Ba'athist regime
was the first obstacle to be overcome before such an Islamic revolution
would be possible. To instigate this revolution, Tehran rallied Iraq's Kurds
and the majority Shi'a population to revolt, and it urged the assassination
of high-ranking Iraqi government officials.223 As a result of mounting
tensions between the two nations, Iraq invaded Iran seemingly at the
acquiescence of the United States.
219. See COCKBURN & COCKBURN, supra note 216, at 74.
220. See Simons, supra note 215, at 7-8 (alleging that Saddam Hussein hunted down thousands
of Iraqis politically opposed to the Ba'ath Party, personally oversaw their torture, and ordered their
murders); SAID K. ABURiSH, SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE POLITICS OF REVENGE 61 (2000).
221. At this time, Hussein was Vice President of the Ba'ath Party under President al-Bakr, as
well as Deputy Chair of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which was the epicenter of
the regime's power and monopolized all branches of Iraqi government. See Michel Moushabeck,
Iraq: Years of Turbulence, in BEYOND THE STORM: A GULF CRISIS READER 25, 30-31 (Phyllis
Bennis & Michel Moushabeck eds., 1991). Hussein eventually compelled President al-Bakr to
retire, and he assumed the Presidency in 1979. For a more detailed account, see DLIP HIRo, IRAQ:
IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 54-57 (2002). Shortly thereafter, Hussein cleansed his RCC of all non-
loyalists by having five high-ranking members of the Council and sixteen others executed, which
he justified as part of a plan to thwart a coup backed by Syria. See Iraq; Facts on Saddam Hussein,
supra note 214.
222. See M.E. Ahrari & Brigid Starkey, Polarity and Stability in the Post-Cold War Persian
Gulf, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1997, at 133, 136-37. Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini
strongly denounced all modernization, particularly Western-oriented or Western-backed secularism,
which he and his theocratic government blamed for displacing the Qur'an and the Sunnah as the
proper foundations for national law. See Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Activist Shi 'ism in Iran, Iraq, and
Lebanon, in 1 FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 403,411 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds.,
1991).
223. John J. Mearsheimer& Stephen M. Wait, An Unncessary War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan./Feb.
2003, at 50, 53; see also ARTHUR MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES




On September 22, 1980, Hussein launched a military campaign against
Iran; Iraqi forces invaded the Iranian territory of Shatt al Arab and the
great Iran/Iraq War commenced.224 Iraq attacked Iran to curb the
theocracy's religion-oriented hegemonic ambitions in the region.225 At
first, Iraq apparently planned to limit the scope of the war to weakening
the Iranian infrastructure to capture its southern territory, which would
give Iraq far better access to the Persian Gulf. 26 This plan never came to
fruition because the intensity of the war significantly escalated. Iraq
responded to this increased intensity by launching chemical attacks on Iran
in 1982.227
Iraq's chemical attack received mixed responses from scholars as to its
propriety. Some suggested that the attack was justified. Authors John J.
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt described it as "an opportunistic
response to a significant threat. 228 Professor Richard Falk, on the other
hand, regarded the invasion as a blatant contravention of international law
and suggested that the world, particularly the United States, wrongly
tolerated it.229 Specifically, he lamented that "the world looked on [the
invasion] with indifference," and he objected to the notion that "non-
involvement is the appropriate response, ' which was the widespread
justification offered by world leaders for permitting the war to rage on.
However it was interpreted, Hussein persisted in depicting his attack on
Iran as necessary to safeguard the entire Gulf region from Iranian
expansionism,23' and the United States agreed.
In February 1982, the United States eventually signaled its approval of
Saddam Hussein's regime by removing Iraq from its list of international
state-sponsors of terrorism.232 As a result, United States corporations were
224. See WEISBURD, supra note 223, at 47.
225. Ahrari & Starkey, supra note 222, at 136-37.
226. See WEISBURD, supra note 223, at 47-48.
227. LEONARD A. COLE, THE ELEVENTH PLAGUE: THE POLITICS OF BIOLOGICAL AND
CHEMICAL WARFARE 87-90 (1997). Iraq's chemical attack against Iran violated the 1925 Geneva
Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological warfare, to which Iraq was a signatory. See
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9433, TREATIES IN FORCE 369
(1997). Iraq employed mustard gas and nerve agents against Iran. COLE, supra, at 88; see also RICK
FRANCONA, ALLY TO ADVERSARY: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF IRAQ'S FALL FROM GRACE 24-25
(1999) (exploring Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iranian military forces).
228. Mearsheimer & Walt, supra note 223, at 53.
229. See Richard Falk, Some Thoughts on the Decline of International Law and Future
Prospects, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399,399 (1981). Falk's distaste for the world's response-or rather,
its lack of what Falk might perceive to be a sufficient response-to the Iran/Iraq war is palpable.
He asserted: "To me, this represents a monumental, unacknowledged retreat from the post-World
War I notion that aggression is the most severe form of disruption of international life." Id.
230. Id.
231. See Moushabeck, supra note 221, at 35.
232. Davis, supra note 211, at 257.
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permitted to ship dual-use goods233 to Iraq.234 Thus, despite its initially
neutral stance in the Iran/Iraq War,235 the United States ultimately offered
material,236 diplomatic,"' agricultural,238 and military239 support to
Hussein.240 Moreover, the United States, along with a series of other
Western nations, sent deadly toxins to Iraq-toxins that collectively
formed the basis of Iraq's biological weapons program.24' Specifically, the
United States Department of Commerce sent under license various
biological agents, including strains of anthrax, to Iraq.242
The United States persisted in its assistance to Saddam Hussein's Iraq
despite Hussein's flagrant deployment of chemical weapons in Iran and
strong evidence that Hussein's regime perpetrated assorted crimes against
humanity. Indeed, in November 1983, a high-ranking State Department
official brought to the attention of Secretary of State George Schultz
intelligence reports, which specified that Iraq was attacking Iranian
military forces with the "almost daily use of cw [chemical weapons]".243
Also, in March 1984, two-time Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
traveled to Baghdad on behalf of President Reagan to negotiate the
233. "Dual-use goods" are those that have both civilian and military utility. See The
Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls on Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies, July 12, 1996 (providing a contemporary definition of dual-use goods).
234. Davis, supra note 211, at 257.
235. See David L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf Between 1984 and 1991:
A JuridicalAnalysis, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 546 (1991).
236. See WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, WEAPONS AT WAR (May 1995), at
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawrep.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). The
United States' political re-designation of Iraq allowed United States corporations to export over
$1.5 billion dollars worth of goods to Iraq from 1985 to 1990, including computer hardware,
software, unarmed light aircraft, machine tools, and helicopters, all of which could easily be
converted for military use. Id. Recipients of these goods included the Iraqi Air Force and Saad 16,
an Iraqi ballistic missile production military complex. Id.
237. DAVIS, supra note 211, at 257.
238. See JAMES A. BAKER, III, THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY 262-63 (1995). Iraq's political
re-designation allowed it to become eligible for agricultural assistance from the Commodity Credit
Corporation under the United States Department of Agriculture; Iraq had thus become the ninth
largest purchaser of United States grain in the world by 1989. Id. at 263.
239. See Michael Dobbs, US. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at
Al. The United States allegedly coordinated sales of cluster bombs to Iraq from a company
headquartered in Chile. Id. Other Western nations also provided arms to Iraq. See Dennis A.
Pluchinsky, Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe in the 1980s: A Decade of
Violence, in EUROPEAN TERRORISM 12 (Yonah Alexander & Dennis A. Pluchinsky eds., 1992)
(stating that from 1985 to 1986 France sold weapons to Iraq).
240. See Moushabeck, supra note 221, at 33; Simons, supra note 215, at 9.
241. COLE, supra note 227, at 81-82. Iraq had help establishing its chemical weapons arsenal;
it received component chemicals and production equipment parts from Belgium, West Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands. Id.
242. Dobbs, supra note 239.
243. Id.
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restoration of diplomatic ties between the United States and Iraq, which
had been suspended since 1967.244 His meeting with Hussein coincided
244. The National Security Archive at George Washington University has extensively
chronicled the relationship between the United States and Saddamn Hussein's Iraq. Documents
released under The Freedom of Information Act and the Mandatory Declassification Review
enabled the National Security Archive to obtain declassified documents on December 18,2003. See
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., THE NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE, at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2004) (making available these documents). These declassified documents detail the
extent to which the United States effectively embraced Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq
throughout the early 1980s in an effort to further its political objective of keeping Iran in check. See
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., SHAKING HANDS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN (Joyce Battle ed., 2003),
at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter SHAKING HANDS WrrH SADDAM HUSSEIN]. They establish that the United States was
aware that its new ally, Hussein, aspired to establish Iraq as a nuclear power, which the United
States acknowledged might "pursue nuclear weapons." Id.
These documents at the National Security Archive include the briefing materials and diplomatic
reporting on two of then-former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's trips to Baghdad, reports
on Iraqi chemical weapons use concurrent with the United States' support of Iraq throughout the
1980s, and directives signed by President Reagan that detail the United States' foreign policy
priorities for the Gulf region, which included preserving the United States' access to oil, expanding
the ability of the United States to exercise military power in the Gulf region, and protecting regional
allies from threats in the Middle East. Id. paras. 14, 17, 11. These declassified documents also
include a United States government report detailing the content of a December 20, 1983
conversation between then-former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein. In an interview with CNN on September 21, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld explained
the nature of his meeting with Hussein: "In that visit, I cautioned him about the use of chemical
weapons ... and discussed a host of other things." CNN, Interview with Donald Rumsfeld (Sept.
21,2002), at http://www.cnn.comfTRANSCRIPTS/0209/2 l/cst.01.html (last visited Oct. 18,2004).
While Secretary Rumsfeld did address chemical weapons in his subsequent meeting with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz-in this meeting, both agreed that "the U.S. and Iraq shared many
common interests"-the report to which he referred did not address comments Rumsfeld allegedly
made to Hussein regarding chemical weapons. See SHAKINGHANDS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, supra,
at paras. 12-13; Dobbs, supra note 239, at Al. Documents detailing the United States' public
position on Iraq's chemical weapons use in the Iran/Iraq War were also declassified. See SHAKING
HANDS wrT SADDAM HUSSEIN, supra, at paras. 17-18. While the United States officially
condemned Iraq's use of chemical weapons, United States officials nevertheless sought to maintain
ties with the Iraqi government by again casting Iran as the real enemy. See id. A declassified
document that denounces Hussein's chemical weapons use also addressed the Ayatollah
Khomeini's unwavering refusal to engage in bilateral talks with Iraq and end hostilities until
Saddam Hussein was removed from power. Specifically, the United States government document
reads, "The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its
avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent
with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it
claims." Id. para. 18. Via the National Security Council, various United States Presidents have
issued directives to guide foreign policy agendas during their administrations; the effect of these
directives is analogous to that of executive orders. See Congressional Limitation of Executive
Orders: Hearing on H.R. 3131, H.R. Con. Res. 30, and H.R. 265S Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 47-48 (1999)
(statement of Professor Phillip Cooper of the University of Vermont). Since they typically are
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with a United Nations report which declared that Iraq was actively using
chemical weapons against Iran.245
The war slowly ground to an end, and Hussein sought to consolidate
his power; in March 1988, Iraqi forces were ordered to retake the Iraqi-
Kurd village of Halabja, which had been overtaken by Iranian forces.246 To
do so, Iraqi forces barraged Halabja with chemical weapons, killing an
estimated five thousand Iraqi-Kurds.247 Still, United States officials sought
to maintain ties to Iraq despite the horror of Halabja, in order to continue
the profitable relationship that the two nations had established. 248 It is
important to note that what might seem like unerring United States
allegiance to Iraq was in truth a form of control; the United States' foreign
policy regarding the Gulf region never permitted Iraq to win the bloody
eight-year war with Iran. While the assistance the United States proffered
to Iraq throughout the war was vast, United States foreign policy architects
never intended for Iraq to win. The policy was formulated to advance the
"'ultimate American interest' . . . that 'both sides lose.', 249 To facilitate
this goal, the United States, along with various other Western nations, not
classified material, Congress is not routinely notified of the contents of these directives. During
President Ronald Reagan's Administration, these directives were referred to as National Security
Decision Directives. See id. Among the declassified documents are two such National Security
Decision Directives: National Security Decision Directive 114 and National Security Decision
Directive 139. Specifically, National Security Decision Directive 114 of November 26, 1983,
entitled "U.S. Policy toward the Iran/Iraq War," detailed United States foreign policy goals to be
achieved during or as a result of the war between Iran and Iraq. Nat'l See. Decision Directive No.
114 (Nov. 26, 1983). These goals chiefly included the protection of regional sources of oil and
developing the capacity to exercise United States military force in the Gulf region. Id. National
Security Decision Directive 139 of April 5, 1984, entitled "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and
Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran/Iraq War," also detailed United States foreign
policy goals with regard to the Iran/Iraq War, including increasing United States military access
to the Gulf region and improving intelligence collection in the region. Nat'l Sec. Decision Directive
No. 139 (Apr. 5, 1984). Moreover, the directive firmly outlines general United States foreign policy
regarding chemical weapons and urges the "unambiguous" censure of all chemical weapons use
by placing "equal stress" on both Iran and Iraq to avoid such use. See id. The document additionally
highlights the protection of Iraq as a goal, for it qualifies Iran's tactics as "ruthless and inhumane."
Id. Accordingly, the document directed United States officials to craft "a plan of action designed
to avert an Iraqi collapse" in the event that Iran gained the upper hand. See id.
245. See Dobbs, supra note 239.
246. Alan Cowell, Iran Charges Iraq with Gas Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1988, at Al1.
247. Id.; Chris Hedges, Kurds Unearthing New Evidence of Iraqi Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 1991, at A 1; YoussefM. Ibrahim, Iran Reports New Iraqi Gas Raids and Says Cities May Be Hit
Next, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1988, at Al.
248. See generally Christopher Dickey& Evan Thomas, How Saddam Happened, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 23, 2002, at 34 (detailing the United States' refusal to discontinue ties with Suddam Hussein's
regime).
249. See Davis, supra note 211, at 256 (attributing this quote to former Secretary of State and
foreign policy scholar Henry Kissinger).
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only assisted Iraq, but also supported Iran,2" in part by encouraging
countries to sell weapons to the anti-West theocracy.25"' The policy worked.
By the end of the war in 1988, over one million lives were lost and no
clear winner was discernable."'
The United States persisted in cultivating ties with Iraq." 3 Ranking
United States government representatives were sent to Iraq for the official
purpose of rebuking Hussein for his regime's use of chemical weapons,
but they also were sent to communicate to Hussein that the United States
continued to support his rule." 4 A book published by the staff of US.
News & World Report, titled Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported
History of the Persian Gulf War, gives the following account:
[O]n April 12, [1990,] five senators, led by Robert Dole, the
minority leader, had met with Saddam Hussein in Mosul. The
senators delivered a letter condemning Iraq's quest for
chemical and nuclear weapons. But, according to Iraqi
officials who secretly taped the meeting and later released a
transcript, Dole wanted to let Saddam know that not everyone
in Washington was against him.2"5
Additionally, two months before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Assistant Secretary
of State John Kelly testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that imposing sanctions against Iraq would be a mistake
because, according to Kelly, Hussein's regime was generally exercising
restraint and cooperation in the region, which were steps in the right
direction.256 Also, on July 25, 1990---eight days before the August 2, 1990
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait-April Glaspie, the United States Ambassador
to Iraq, met with Saddam Hussein at his Presidential Palace in Baghdad. 7
250. See MARK PHYTHIAN, ARMING IRAQ 24-25 (1997).
251. See id. at 33.
252. See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Great Terror, NEW YORKER, Mar. 25, 2002, at 52, 55.
253. In October 1989, President George H.W. Bush delivered National Security Decision
Directive 26, which asserted that "[njormal relations between the United States and Iraq would
serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East." Nat'l
Sec. Decision Directive No. 26 (Oct. 2, 1989).
254. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, TRIUMPH WITHOuT VICTORY: THE UNREPORTED HISTORY
OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 19 (1992).
255. Id. The other four senators were Alan Simpson, Frank Murkowski, James McClure, and
Howard Metzenbaum. Sen. Arlen Specter, Confrontation in the Gulf- War and Peace: A Sampling
from the Debate on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at A8.
256. United States Policy Toward Iraq: Human Rights, Weapons Proliferation, and
International Law: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 5 (1990)
(testimony of Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly); see also Jim Hoagland, Editorial, Turning
a Blind Eye to Baghdad, WASH. POST, July 5, 1990, at A19.
257. Roxanne Roberts, The Silence of the Diplomat, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at CI.
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The content of the conversation that took place has been the subject of
debate from the moment the transcript was made available.258 Regardless
of the tone of the conversation, Ambassador Glaspie uttered the now
infamous assertion to Hussein that the United States has "no opinion on
the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." '259
Despite this support, United States foreign policy regarding Iraq
changed drastically when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
Notably, Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was not unanticipated by the
United States. In 1989, the United States military commenced battle
simulations, which drilled maneuvers specifically designed to repel Iraqi
armed forces from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia in the event of an invasion.260
There was steadily mounting evidence that Hussein was planning to attack
Kuwait, with which Iraq had continuing border and economic disputes.26'
On April 1, 1990, Hussein gave a speech that elucidated Iraq's chemical
weapon capabilities when he publicly threatened to use these weapons
against Israel if Tel Aviv attacked Iraq as part of a Coalition effort to
defend Kuwait.262 Hussein was evidently levying a threat against the
United States, Israel's long-standing ally. Indeed, the United States was
again forced to come to terms with the fact that yet another former cohort
(of sorts) had become a mortal enemy.
258. Id. (reporting that the State Department maintained that the transcript ofthe conversation
between Glaspie and Hussein that was released by the Iraqis "was heavily edited and excludes
Glaspie's sharper remarks to Saddam and his assurances that he had no intentions of invading
Kuwait").
259. Id.
260. See WILLIAM BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S. MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE
WORLD WAR II, at 324 (1995).
261. See BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 206-07 (1991) ("[Blorder disputes and
animosities continued [between Iraq and Kuwait, in spite of Iraq's] ... acquiesce[nce] to Kuwait's
status as a nation when [Iraq] permitted Kuwait's admission to the Arab League in 1963.").
Specifically, by the late 1980s, Iraq was extraordinarily indebted to various Arab nations,
particularly Kuwait, to which Hussein owed over $14 billion. Generally, Hussein proclaimed that
Iraq's engagement in the Iran-Iraq war defended the interests of the entire Gulf region; this,
according to Hussein, mitigated all debt that Iraq incurred from its Arab lender. This argument was
not well received. Hussein had planned to repay Iraq's debts by cutting Iraq's OPEC oil production,
thereby increasing the price of oil. However, Kuwait countered by increasing its own oil
production, which lowered oil prices and thwarted Hussein's plan; Kuwait ostensibly did so to gain
leverage in its ongoing border dispute with Iraq. As a result, tension between Iraq and Kuwait
hugely escalated. Hussein accused Kuwait of taking advantage of the Iran-Iraq War when it drilled
for oil and constructed military installations in the territory of Iraq proximate to Kuwait. These
factors are generally understood to be the underlying reasons for the intense Iraq-Kuwait hostility,
which culminated in Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. For more information on the
Persian Gulf War, see generally HIRO, supra note 221.
262. WOODWARD, supra note 261, at 201; see also Davis, supra note 211, at 274.
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The United States assembled a coalition to drive Hussein's armed
forces out of Kuwait.2 63 This coalition, led by the United States, launched
an air campaign against Iraq that began on January 16, 1991, and raged for
thirty-eight days."6 Then began the ground operation, which ended within
100 hours, and resulted in Iraq's surrender.
2 65
The United States proffered a variety of public justifications for its
involvement in the Persian Gulf War. The ostensible initial justification
was that immediate action was necessary to defend the United States'
access to existing channels of oil because the United States economy was
entirely dependant on this oil. President George H.W. Bush also portrayed
United States involvement as required to protect Saudi Arabia, a long-
standing American ally, from an Iraqi invasion,266 despite the lack of
evidence that Hussein was planning such an attack. Other justifications
emerged as the public outcry 67 against a war premised on the United
States' dependency on oil intensified. These justifications included Iraq's
extensive history of human rights violations in and out of the context of
the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein's pursuit of nuclear weapons, Iraq's continued
defiance of a series of United Nations General Security Council
Resolutions, 6' and Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in and of itself,2 69 which
263. This coalition consisted of thirty-four countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Kathy Gill, War in Iraq, at
http://uspolitics.about.com/od/wariniraq/i/iraq-overview.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
264. See David Ballingrud & Tom Drury, Gulf War Revisited, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Florida), Jan. 12, 2003, at IA.
265. See William M. Arkin, The Gulf 'Hyperwar '--An Interim Tally, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1991, Op-Ed section, at 23 (discussing the impact of the Gulf War).
266. See Bush: No Appeasement, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at PI (reporting on President
George H.W. Bush's news conference on August 8, 1990, in which the President announced that
the United States sought to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression).
267. See Glenn Frankel, Millions Worldwide Protest Iraq War, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003,
at Al.
268. As a P-5 member of the United Nations Security Council, the United States officially
approved of each of the sixty UNSC Resolutions specifically levied against Iraq, which were each
created alter Iraq proclaimed its antipathy to the United States and its allies. The first of these,
Resolution 660, was created on August 2, 1990, condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and
demanded that it immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait. See S.C. Res. 660, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). This Resolution was followed by a
series of analogous resolutions until the Council voted to adopt ofResolution 678, which authorized
the use of force. See id.; S.C. Res. 661 U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990); S.C.
Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990); S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th
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President George H.W. Bush categorized as "naked aggression. 2 70 All of
these reasons were valid, regardless of whether they manifested the true
reasons why the United States led what was designated Operation Desert
Storm, because taken together they showed how Saddam Hussein's Iraq
significantly endangered the national security of the United States.2 7'
In addition to the support proffered to Hussein by the CIA, which
helped facilitate his rise to power, the United States expended considerable
effort opening channels that permitted American companies to arm and
materially support Hussein's Iraq. In other words, the United States
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990); S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/667 (1990); S.C. Res. 669, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/669
(1990); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990); S.C. Res.
674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); S.C. Res. 677, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess. 2962d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/677 (1990).
269. See Davis, supra note 211, at 252.
270. Dan Balz, President Pessimistic About Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1990, at A48.
271. Saddam Hussein was long thought to have been working to construct nuclear weapons
in order to match Israeli WMD developments. This belief seized the attention of the international
community, especially the United States and Israel. In 198 1, Israel claimed it acted in self-defense
when it bombed an inactive Iraqi nuclear reactor, arguing that Iraq was going to use the reactor to
make nuclear weapons to threaten Israel. STANB4MR A. ALExANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159-60 (1996). If Saddam Hussein was indeed seeking to
secretly develop nuclear WMD, which would be over and above the stocks of chemical WMD he
had already developed and employed, the possibility of his development of a sophisticated delivery
system posed a grave future threat to the national security of the United States. Hussein's indignant
attitude toward United Nations Security Council Resolutions also became a sore point for the
United States; in seeking the rollback of Iraq after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States
confronted certain ethnic conflicts and acts of aggression, which positioned the United States to
generally conform its national security policy to the framework of the United Nations Charter. See
Nagan & Hammer, supra note 23, at 400. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was rebuked in international
circles where the values of the United Nations Charter, having survived the Cold War, were directly
threatened by Hussein's unilateral repudiation. The invasion was a direct violation of Article 2(4),
and there was no pretense that Article 51 could cover the obviousness of the aggression. United
States national defense and defense of the United Nations Charter became core reasons to wage war
against Hussein's Iraq. These reasons comprised a more moral justification for fighting a country
that posed a significant threat to vital energy interests in the region. Multilateralism became
fashionable, and President George H.W. Bush viewed this as an opportunity to construct a different
national security doctrine. Id. With the benefit of hindsight, some United States government
officials and scholars now feel that the threat posed by Hussein to United States national security
was best illustrated by his attempt to assassinate President George H.W. Bush. See, e.g., Richard
Bernstein, Raid on Baghdad: The United Nations, U.S. Presents Evidence to UN. Justifying Its
Missile Attack on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A7 (reporting Madeleine K. Albright's
statement to the United Nations that the Clinton Administration was justified in attacking an Iraqi
intelligence site because it was self defense against the Iraqi government's plot to assassinate
former President George H. W. Bush); Raid on Baghdad: Excerpts from UN. Speech: The Case
for Clinton's Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A7 (reporting excerpts of the statement of
Madeleine K. Albright, United States delegate to the United Nations, about evidence linking Iraq
to the attempt to assassinate President George H.W. Bush).
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endeavored to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with Hussein's
regime even as that regime flaunted its brutality. As evidenced above, the
foreign policy goal of this long-lasting support was to balance the political
environment of the Gulf region; when the relationship between the two
nations soured-in part because of the conflict created by simultaneous
United States support of mortal enemies Iraq and Israel-Hussein turned
against the United States. What has happened since between the United
States and Iraq continues to be thoroughly documented.272 The process by
which the two nations devolved into arch-nemeses is elementary. Had the
United States employed a different policy regarding Iran's attempt at
democracy (recalling that its actual policy significantly assisted in the
creation of the tyrannical theocracy that is present-day Iran), the United
States likely would not have been compelled to intervene in Iraq to the
extent that it did (if, indeed, at all) to establish a secular counterweight in
the Gulf region. Not only does this mean that the Iran-Iraq War could have
been averted had United States foreign policy been crafted differently with
regard to both countries, but the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert
Storm) as well as the 2003 war in Iraq (Operation Enduring Freedom) may
have never been necessary. In any case, it is again evident that the foreign
policy of the United States embraced a characteristically corrupt, violent
regime for the purpose of furthering United States interests. When
relations with that regime eventually fell apart, it turned against its one-
time ally and, as indicated above, the United States national security was
seriously imperiled as a result.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Dinh re-characterizes nationalism as a means of achieving an end
internal to the enterprise of national security rather than as a technique for
promoting national solidarity-a beneficial, redistributive goal intrinsic to
it, but outside of the national security discourse. By doing so, Dinh and
those who follow his lead succeed in dampening the meanings of the
statements uttered or written by the speakers and authors to whom Dinh
cites in Part IV of his article. The heuristic value of such an "internal"
perspective on nationalism in the American citizenry provides greater
illumination about the key questions regarding the value and purpose of
legitimate nationalism under consideration than does a perspective that
imperceptibly shifts between values internal and external to issues of
national security. Dinh, however, does not suggest that all internal and
external value implications be considered. We submit that these internal
272. See generally Nagan & Hammer, supra note 23 (examining historically significant
national security doctrines and the legal basis underlying the 2003 American attack on Iraq in order
to explore the Bush Administration's international policy determinations).
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and external values have important points of overlap; from a practical
standpoint, these overlapping intersections about the goals and values of
nationalism are an inevitable element of the task of using disciplined
intellectual tools to ground these value judgments and perspectives in
particular contexts.
Dinh seeks to bind crony nationalism to the province of national
defense as the nation's primary mechanism to fight terror.273 He seems to
search for away in which everyday citizens can join in the fight. We seek
to ground the value judgment of nationalism in its correct and legitimate
context: as an ever-useful tool for the everyday citizen to resist chaos.
Thus, nationalism has inherent value in the war on terror, but not as the
first line of national defense. This is an important distinction. All
Americans are obligated to participate in the war on terror, but the most
useful and practical mechanism at their disposal is a voting booth. This is
because the most effective weapon against terror is not crony nationalism,
but a strong, carefully conceived foreign policy.
As Dinh briefly noted in the second paragraph of his article, American
citizens must be prevention-minded, while American foreign policy must
be preemption-minded.274 With regard to American foreign policy, Dinh
apparently echoes President George W. Bush's Administration's doctrinal
philosophy of preemptive warfare rather than the largely accepted formula
of essentially reactive warfare.275 While there are theoretical justifications
273. It is important to note that some scholars would likely take issue with the whole of Dinh's
argument, for some like author, scholar, and nationalism expert John Breuilly have argued that "it
seems to be impossible to produce an independent definition of the nation which can be correlated
in any reliable way with the existence or intensity of nationalism." BREUILLY, supra note 71, at
405.
274. See Dinh, supra note 2, at 867.
275. The traditional concept of national self-defense is usually deciphered by exploring the
dictates of Articles 51 and 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, as well as the customary
international law articulated by the Caroline doctrine and in the Nicaragua case. Article 51 holds
that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER
art. 51. Article 2(4) holds that "[a]Il Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Id. at
art. 2, para. 4. The Caroline doctrine can be used to give substance to these general rules; the
doctrine recognizes the "'necessity of... self-defence [that] is instant, overwhelming, and leav[es]
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary
of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), in 2 JoHN BASSETT MOORE,
A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906). The International Court of Justice has stated that
a state may only use "self-defence... measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94
(June 27). The United States interpreted this customary international law pronouncement to mean
that the lawfulness of an act of national self-defense depends in part on the necessity and the
proportionality of the measures taken. See id. at 103.
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that support the new Bush doctrine of preemptive action,276 a more
valuable version of preemptive-mindedness has long been the foreign
policy tool of preemptive strategizing to displace potential or otherwise
inevitable conflicts. Despite the intuitiveness and relative simplicity of this
approach to the war on terror, the United States has nevertheless engaged
in undertakings that do not comport'with it.277 An important lesson to be
gleaned is that the United States must craft the security interests of its
foreign policy such that interference in the political infrastructures of other
states is available as an option only if blowback-the likes of which the
United States has experienced, most notably in the above
examples-might be avoided in order to safeguard the citizenry of the
United States. But most critically, the long-term interests of the United
States' foreign policy are vindicated when foreign policy is consistent with
the fundamental democratic rule-of-law values upon which the Republic
was founded.
276. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 23, at 413-33.
277. Through its foreign policy, the United States has long cultivated ties-indeed, even
embraced dictators-that would eventually prove extremely harmful to United States interests or
national security. Despite this alarming trend, it appears to us that the same foreign policy mistakes
are being made time and again. We believe the reason for this is that the philosophy underlying the
cultivation of such problematic alliances has not changed; some moral compromises are deemed
necessary to acquire pro-West, secular support from foreign regimes to further United States
economic interests or for intelligence acquisition. Perhaps President Franklin Delano Roosevelt best
articulated this compromise when he spoke of United States support for 1930s Nicaraguan dictator
Anastasio Somoza by asserting that "[hie may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."
STANLEY KARNOW, IN OuR IMAGE: AMERICA'S EMPIRE IN THE PI-LIPPINES 388 (1989).
[Vol. 56
